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ABSTRACT
This report examines the history of automobile safety regulation
since 1966, viewed as an attempt to substitute public decisions on the
design of new automobiles for private decisions. The focus of the
examination is on the problems which confront regulators in the National
Highway Traffic Safety Administration (NHTSA) in their attempt to affect
the design and performance of automobiles and on the effect regulation
has actually had on automotive technology.
Congress gave the NHTSA two ways of bringing about changes in the
design and performance of automobiles. The NHTSA may set mandatory
performance standards for automobiles and may conduct research and
development on new automobile safety technology. Congress did not set a
programmed goal that was to be achieved through these methods, however.
Instead, the NHTSA must continually decide in an ad hoc fashion the
desirability of particular changes in the attributes of new cars. Those
that it finds desirable must be forced into practice through standards.
The purpose of the agency's R&D is to make possible for the first time
additional changes in vehicle attributes which the agency may then choose
to force into practice as well.
Several inherent problems in developing the technical requirements
in proposals for new standards and in judging the desirability of
proposals have not been fully resolved by the NHTSA. They have had a
detrimental effect on the number and quality of standards promulgated
since the initial set. The agency's efforts in developing new technology
have also faced problems and have so far not contributed to its standards.
In order for regulatory action to be taken, policy decisions must be
made to compensate for uncertainties in predictions of the impacts of.
proposed standards. Policy decisions must also be made as to the
desirable balance between reductions in traffic risks and increased
costs. The uncertainties could be reduced if more reliance were placed
on large-scale experimental testing of contemplated safety modifications
in actual use. The policy choices that would remain, of both types,
could be improved if they were recognized as such and the process for
making them opened up to greater outside inspection and participation.
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CHAPTER ONE
INTRODUCTION
The purpose of this report is to analyze automobile safety regula-
tion, viewed as an attempt to substitute centralized decisions for
private decisions on the design of automobiles.
1.1 Background and Motivation
In 1966, with the enactment of the National Traffic and Motor
1
Vehicle Safety Act, the federal government began a new regulatory
effort: the establishment of mandatory standards for the safety of new
motor vehicles.
The creation of new federal regulatory regimes had not been uncommon
in United States history prior to 1966. Such action had often been the
response of Congress to perceived problems that were not being adequately
dealt with by private economic activity, the system of common law, or the
individual states. Many of the older and better known regulatory
agencies and commissions had been involved primarily with economic regu-
lation of market entry, industry concentration, prices, and unfair trade
practices. But safety regulation had not been uncommon either. Many of
the regulatory agencies whose primary concern was economic regulation had
also been active in safety regulation; this was particularly true in
transportation. And health and safety regulation in the areas of food
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and drugs, insecticides, flammable fabrics, and hazardous substances
labeling predated motor vehicle safety regulation. One might thus
conclude that the regulatory effort begun in 1966 had well-established
precedents.
But the National Traffic and Motor Vehicle Safety Act created a
regulatory regime that was different from most earlier regimes in impor-
tant ways. The older programs of health and safety regulation were
primarily restrictive in the way they dealt with harmful products and
technologies. They sought to protect public health and afety by pro-
hibiting the conduct of certain activities and the sale f certain types
of products. Only in a few areas of regulation, for example air, rail,
and pipeline transportation, was the use of well known safety technology
made a precondition to entry and operation in a regulated market. Under,
for example, the Food, Drug, and Cosmetic Act the federal government
ptrhibits the marketing of drugs which are considered unsafe. It gener-
Ally leaves to private action the discovery and developmaent of subsitute
dtugs which are safe.
l[n aotrast, the 1966 Act was intended by its sponsors and support-
tta to induce technological change towards greater safety in a product
ather than simply to restrict the sale of unsafe products or to require
th 'uae b established safety technology. The Act created the institu-
tifos nd tools by which the federal government could play an active and
bbt'inuing 'role in inducing changes in motor vehicle design in particular
desirable directions rather than simply blocking off certain undesirable
iltections. The sponsors and supporters of the Act had in mind the
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immediate, forced incorporation into a11 nw automobiles of a particular
set of safety features that had previously seen only scattered use. They
also envisioned regulation on other types of motor vehicles and safety
changes that would come from beyond the contemporary state of the art.
In retrospect the 1966 Act, together with the 1965 Motor Vehicle Air
Pollution Control Act,2 was a momentous step in the history of the
American automobile industry and its relationship with the federal
government. For the first time, a federal agency could accomplish
changes in many aspects of the design and performance of all auto-
mobiles. Emissions standards for automobiles had been promulgated under
the 1965 law several months before passage of the National Traffic and
Motor Vehicle Safety Act, but they were relatively mild and restricted in
Scope. The provisions of the 1966 Act allowed standards affecting many
more aspects of design and performance.
The automobile industry is one of America's largest and most concen-
trated and its products arf! used daily by a hundred million Americans.
bf the earlier health and afety regulatory programs, only food and drug
teguition had the potential for affecting as important an industry as
this one. Automobile safety regulation can thus be viewed as a signifi-
ta&ntly novel attempt to consciously control by central decision the
aebign and performance of the products of a key industry without regu-
itting the industry itself. The new regulatory regime was a departure
ifrom both past. federal policies of laissez-faire towards the automobile
industry and the government-sanctioned cartels that were frequent in
bther programs of regulation. Regulation of automobile safety was a
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major and early entrant.in a category of regulation that has since grown
to inclpde occupational health and safety, automobile fuel economy,
consumer product safety, and a wide variety of environmental regulations.
1.2 Problem Definition
Intention and the enactment of an enabling law are only the first
steps in a program of regulation, however. Regulation intended to prod
firms still run by private individuals into changing the technology of
their products requires that regulatory decisions much like the original
decision to regulate be made more or less continuously. Standards must
be developed, promulgated, and enforced. The day-to-day and year-to-year
administration of a regulatory program can become as important in deter-
mining its effects on the target products as the enactment or exact
wording of the act which established it.
Thus this report will review, analyze and critique the continuing
federal effort to induce changes in the design and performance of auto-
mobiles towards greater safety. The rationale for beginning the regu-
latory regime will not be examined in any detail. Instead, the emphasis
will be on the regulatory process once begun and the effects it has
actually had on automobiles. The intent is to examine what has been
accomplished and what has not, and why. Automobile safety regulation
offers an opportunity to study what happens once the mechanisms for
partial collectivization of design decisions are established for a
product whose characteristics and role have been found to be so important
as to warrant the establishment of such mechanisms.
11
Automobile safety regulation is singled out from the broader area of
motor vehicle safety regulation established by the 1966 Act and adminis-
tered by the National Highway Traffic Safety Administration. It is
appropriate to do so, since the sponsors and supporters of the 1966 Act
were clearly most concerned with the safety of passenger automobiles.
Before leaving other classes of motor vehicles behind, however, it is
worth noting that the history of regulation for these other classes is
interesting in its own right. It does, however, present a different
topic as the nature of the regulated industries and the oles of their
products are much different.
The six chapters which follow analyze the process n;id accomplish-
ments of slightly more than a decade of automobile safety regulation,
both in comparison to the intentions and expectations of 1966 and on
their Own merits, apart from what might have seemed possible or desirable
in 1966.
Chapter 2 very briefly reviews the history that led up to the
p&Lbage Of the National Traffic and Motor Vehicle Safety Act in 1966.
The chapter also sumarizes relevant portions of the Act,. discusses the
t0le of judicial review of agency-administered regulations, and.gives a
ihOtt description of the National Highway Traffic Safety Administration.
Chapte 2 is included as background for readers unfamiliar with auto-
Wbile safety issues. Readers who are familiar with the area and with
administrative procedures for federal regulation are urged to skip the
chapter.
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Chapter 3 gives an overview of the history and content of the safety
standards for automobiles which have been issued to date and of some that
were proposed but not issued. This chapter also is intended primarily as
background, although it does give a preliminary appraisal of the effect
the standards have had on automotive technology relative to some of the
expectations that were evident in 1966.
A characteristic of these early expectations was that they were not
all very well formulated. The struggle in 1966 was to e;tablish a
federal program of regulation; the goals of the program S;uffered in their
clear expression from the necessities of political symbc'.ism, compromise,
and legislative obfuscation. Chapter 4 therefore re-exEines what the
objectives of a regulatory program aimed at at least a partial substitu-
tion of centralized direction for market and private decisionmaking could
and should be. The chapter interprets the program as having two objec-
tives, both of which can be considered to be forms of technological
change. The first is to force into use socially desirable changes in
design and performance which could be but have not been adopted by
private decision; the second is to find new technologies which might make
possible for the first time additional desirable changes. Chapter 4 also
discusses the concepts of social desirability and technological change.
Taking as given this interpretation of the NHTSA's goals, Chapters 5
and 6 review and analyze how the National Highway Traffic Safety Adminis-
tration has gone about achieving the two objectives. Chapter 5 deals
13
with' the first objective. It reviews the process of developing safety
standards, the problems that arise in development, and the consequences
of the unresolved problems for the process and results of regulation.
Chapter 6 is concerned with research and development, the technology-
discovering portion of the regulatory program. Since industry R&D has
kept its dominant role through the last ten years the chapter analyzes
the incentives and disincentives for the industry itself to work towards
the second objective. It then recounts and appraises the government's
efforts in the same direction. Chapter 6 also discusses "technology
forcing" - requiring by law or standard levels of performance which can
be achieved by industry only if it expends its own resources on finding
new technologies -- as a method of generating new technology. Technology
forcing has not seen use in automobile safety regulation but its use in
automobile emissions regulation makes it a necessary part of any
discussion of safety regulation.
Chapter 7 summarizes very briefly the points made in earlier
chapters about the last ten years of automobile safety regulation. It
makes some conclusions about what that history implies about attempts to
replace private decisions with public decisions. Chapter 7 ends with
some recommendations for improvements in the process of regulation which
may help improve its results as well.
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1.3 . Previous Work
The study of automobile safety has not been a neglected activity.
Automobile safety regulation is important for two reasons. One is that
the problem it addresses -- traffic injuries and fatalities -- is
immense in its impact on the nation. Over 45,000 traffic deaths and
millions of disabling injuries are suffered each year. The economic
costs of motor vehicle accidents have been estimated as low as $15.8
billion and as high as $46 illion per year. Either figure represents
a significant fraction of :ie total costs of automotive transportation.
The second reason is that, like almost everything involved with the huge
automobile industry and the national automobile fleet, automobile safety
regulation affects the allocation of large amounts of social resources.
Passenger car buyers paid an estimated $14.5 billion for federal safety
requirements as part of the prices of 1966 to 1974 cars.4 The manufac-
turers presumably bore additional costs they were unable to recover from
buyers. It is not surpri. ng that considerable attention has been given
to the subject of automobile safety, given the size of the stakes
involved.
While some scholarly interest in automobile safety was shown during
the first few years of automobile safety regulation, other forms of regu-
lation have since diverted most of this attention. The published results
of the early attention concerned the welfare economics of the decision to
replace market mechanisms with regulation and the politics of the
5-9
decision as it was made by Congress. This work came too early to
have dealt with the process of regulation once the decision to do so had
15
been made. The study and debate about the ongoing process of automobile
safety regulation has been left primarily to the participants in the
regulatory process itself: the automobile manufacturing and related
industries, the insurance industry, the three branches of the federal
government, institutionalized consumer and public interest groups, and
consultants and contractors to each. These participants have produced a
very large literature on automobile safety. The vast majority of the
literature is technical and addresses the problem of automobile safety
rather than the process of automobile safety regulation. Most of the
remainder that does addres3 the regulatory process tends to be advocative
rather than analytic, although it does contain much relevant information
and many insights. Some of the more important works are listed as
1 0
-
19
references to this chapter.
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CHAPTER TWO
HISTORICAL, LEGAL, AND INSTITUTIONAL BACKGROUND FOR
FEDERAL INVOLVEMENT IN AUTOMOBILE SAFETY REGULATION
Readers who are not familiar with the history of automobile safety
regulation should find the background material presented in this chapter
useful in following the discussions in later chapters. Persons who have
been involved with this particular form of regulation will find that this
chapter contains no surprises for them.
2.1 The Automobile Safety Problem and the Genesis
of Federal Involvement
The commonly accepted division of the causes of traffic fatalities
and injuries is into three categories: the performance of the driver, the
design and performance of the vehicle, and the "environmental" conditions
of highway design, traffic pattern, weather, etc. The interactions and
relative importance of the three aspects are subtle-and difficult to
quantify or measure, and are subjects of continuing dispute. But clearly
each of the three is capable of affecting to some degree both the like-
lihood that a given trip will result in an accident and the injury that
results from an accident if one occurs. The "automobile safety problem"
concerns only the role of the vehicle. The other two factors are usually
thought of as together comprising a "highway safety problem".
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The elements of automobile safety hve traditionally been separated
into three categories. Accident avoidance, or crash avoidance, covers
those aspects of vehicle design and performance that affect the like-
lihood of accidents of different severity levels, with severity defined
in terms of vehicle mechanics. Braking, steering handling, stability,
lighting and signaling, driver field of view, control layout, etc. are in
this category. Crashworthiness covers those aspects of vehicle design
and performance which affe:t the injury that occupants, and other persons
such as pedestrians, receive in an.accident of a given type and
severity. Occupant restraint systems, vehicle structural
characteristics, and interior compartment design are some of the factors
in this category. Aspects which affect the safety and recovery of
occupants and others after an accident has occurred and the initial
injuries have been sus- tained are termed postcrash. Susceptibility to
postcrash fire and the ease of occupant removal for medical treatment are
in this last category.
It was only recently hat it became accepted that there was a
"national automobile safety problem" that would require or respond to
federal involvement. Traffic fatalities have accompanied motorized
personal transportation from its birth near the end of the last century.
And in the earlier years of the industry, when the basic design of auto-.
mobiles was far from standardized, manufacturers advertized the innova-
tive safety features of their products -- features that were often as
necessary for comfortable driving as for safe driving.. But when most
automobiles were able to stop reliably under normal conditions and had
low centers of gravity and rigid all-steel bodies, the role of the
20
vehicle itself in traffic f-t- !ity nA ;- ,-y causation came to seem not
as important as the role of the driver. Of the two the driver was
clearly the least reliable. And in the early years, the condition of
most roadways was also poor compared to the seemingly advanced design of
automobiles. It was thus reasonable that public and private efforts
might have been and in fact were focused on driver training and
licensing, traffic law enforcement, and road construction and improvement
for most of the first half of the twentieth century. Since state and
local governments were traditionally responsible for police functions,
motor vehicle registration, and public roads, federal involvement in
these efforts was minimal.
In the late 1940s and early 1950s an awareness developed among
medical practicioners, state traffic safety officials, and a few state
and federal legislators that the design of an automobile could be a
significant causal factor in the production of injuries during an acci-
dent. The automobile mant, acturers also were aware of the causal
relation, and of some des gn approaches for mitigating injuries. The
Ford Motor Company used a crashworthiness-oriented advertising campaign
and a package of safety options to promote its 1956 model line, with
disputed success. Public awareness began to grow and concerned
individuals and groups began urging the manufacturers to adopt known
crashworthiness designs.
The industry folklore is that the Ford safety campaign was a failure
that damaged overall sales and was abandoned for that reason. Some
observers of the industry dispute this, contending that sales of Fords
were down in 1956 because of their styling def~c5s and citing figures to
show that the safety package itself sold well. '
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The automobile manufacturers did not continue the Ford'approach to
safety promotion, and automobile safety gradually became an item on the
political agendas at various levels of government. The subsequent his-
tory is complex, and documented well elsewhere.4 '5 Briefly, the auto-
mobile manufacturers resisted attempts to make a political issue of the
design of their products and opposed each step of regulation as it came.
Some voluntary product changes were reluctantly made. But by the late
1950s, crashworthiness was an issue in several state leE.-.slatures, pro-
moted vigorously by New York State Senator Edward Speno. By the early
1960s Congressman Kenneth Roberts, who had been advocati lg a federal
involvement since 1956, had succeeded in getting mandatory federal stan-
dards issued for the performance of brake fluids and seat belts.6'7 In
1964, the General Services Administration (GSA) was given statutory
authority to set safety standards for automobiles purchased by the
federal government; it was hoped that this would encourage the manu-
facturers to adopt safety features on the rest of their production. In
1965 activity in Congress intensified with some dramatic subcommittee
9hearings in the Senate. In November of 1965 Ralph Nader published
Unsafe at Any Speed.1O The book increased public awareness not only of
crashworthiness issues but also of accident avoidance problems by detail-
ing the allegedly unsafe handling characteristics of the early Corvairs.
In 1966 the National Traffic and Motor Vehicle Safety Act was passed
by unaminous vote in both Houses of Congress, a rare event that illus-
trates how successfully the political line had been drawn between those
in favor of halting the "carnage on the highways" and those opposed.
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Very, few Congressmen were opposed, aind none were for the record. A
companion act, the National Highway Safety Act, was also passed in
1966 opening a major role for the federal government in the other areas
of traffic safety that had traditionally been the responsibility of the
states.
2.2 The National TraEfic and Motor Vehicle Safety Act of 1966
Congress gave recognition to the distinction between accident
avoidance and crashworthiness by declaring twin purposes for the National
Traffic and Motor Vehicle Safety Act 'of 1966 (hereinafter the Safety
Act): to reduce traffic accidents and to reduce deaths and injuries from
traffic accidents. Title I of the Act has four main provisions relevant
to the regulation of new motor vehicles: provisions for the establishment
of Federal motor vehicle safety standards (MVSS) by the Secretary of
Transportation, for mand,::ory manufacturer notification. to owners of
vehicles with newly discovered safety defects, for government-conducted
and supported testing, research, and development, and for a consumer in-
formation program whereby manufacturers would be required to furnish in-
formation on the safety performance of competing new car models. Title
II deals with new tire safety. It calls for the establishment of a uni-
form grading system for tire quality and specifies in more detail the
content of any safety standards for new tires.
* The Act as passed out the new regulatory program under the Secretary
of Commerce. The Secretry of Transportation was given responsibility
for the program very sh.' -tly after passage of the Act.
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The tire safety, defect no.rication a- consumer information provisions
of the Safety Act are not of particular relevance to following chapters
and will not be elaborated here. The details of the statutory provisions
for the establishment of safety standards and for research and develop-
ment are, on the other hand, very important to understanding the history
of the Act's implementation.. The following two subsections therefore
discuss in some depth these two provisions. A third ubsection explains
the statutory provisions for and the importance of judicial review of
newly issued safety standards.
2.2.1 Motor Vehicle Safety Standards
Content of Standards
Federal motor vehicle safety standards may regulate either complete
motor vehicles or individual items of motor vehicle equipment. The
Safety Act places five restrictions on the content of standards. A
standard must be "stated in objective terms" and provide "objective
criteria"; it may prescribe only minimum levels of vehicle or equipment
"performance", not the design details of how that performance will be
obtained; it must be "practicable"; it must be "appropriate"; and it must
"meet the need for motor vehicle safety", defined in the Act as the
protection of the public from "unreasonable risks associated with motor -
vehicle design and performance." These are the five necessary conditions
for the legal validity of a motor vehicle safety standard; at one time or
another, each has been used to challenge a standard in court. The
conditions merit fuller discussion.
24
The requirement that a standard be objective and provfde objective
criteria has been interpretted to mean that compliance tests must be
repeatable and not open to personal interpretations. In an industry with
a long cycle of planning and tooling before production begins, like
automobile manufacturing, manufacturers must be able to assure themselves
at the prototype stage that their final products will comply with federal
standards if tested by the government. There must be criteria in the
standard which allow both manufacturer and government tec.ting to reach
the same conclusion as to whether a vehicle in question ieets the
requirements of a given standard. The compliance testir.: procedure
specified in a standard necessarily becomes the crucial Determinant of
the standard's actual requirements, since legal action will be based on
the results of that test procedure. Requirements that are not objec-
tively stated are essentially unenforceable. A few existing MVSSs
contain such unobjective requirements; MVSS 108, for example, requires
certain spacings to be as far apart as practical.1 2
The restriction that federal motor vehicle safety standards specify
only performance and not design was intended by its drafters to ensure
that federal standards did not inhibit innovative designs by freezing
existing designs into place. Congressional preference for performance
standards is of long standing. Several other product safety laws before
and since the Safety Act have favored performance standards, though not
always as unconditionally as the Safety Act does.3 It is worth noting
that the avoidance of design-type standards has never been absolute under
the Safety Act, either in practice or in law. The precise distinction
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between design and performance requirements is not always clear, and
standards have been in effect with provisions that could easily be inter-
preted as specifying design approaches if not actual design details,
rather than performance. And in one case of judicial. review, the court
decided that the provisions of the Safety Act did not constitute an
absolute ban on all design standards. The court ruled in that case that
where the'stifling effect on innovation was minor and the design restric-
tion was necessary to the afe performance of a vehicle, it was not
inconsistent with Congressional intent for the'standard in question to
specify dimensions and tolerances, details that were undisputedly design
in nature.1 4
The meaning of the requirement that standards be practicable has
been an important point of dispute. The automobile manufacturers' trade
association tried but failed to get more specific language on lead time,
customary model changes, and commensurability of costs and safety
benefits included in the ;Safety Act instead of the vague practicability
language. The Senate Cnerce Comnittee went so far as to state only
that while it wanted safety to be the overriding consideration in the
issuance of standards, it recognized that the Secretary would necessarily
consider reasonableness of cost, feasibility, and adequate lead time. At
a minimum, practicability seems to require that compliance with a stan-
dard be technically feasible by its effective date, even though achieving
compliance by that date may be a burden or even a hardship on a manufac-
turer. Congress did not contemplate that the manufacture of automobiles
would be halted because a safety standard could not be met. Beyond this,
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there is no universally accepted-meaning o the practi:ability
requirement.
The meaning of the requirement that a standard be appropriate is
that a standard must be drafted with consideration given to the particu-
lar characteristics of the item it regulates. The drafting committees
did not intend that such widely varying types of vehicles as luxury cars,
compacts, convertibles, and sports cars would have to'meet identical
performance standards. The appropriateness requirement essentially
places a burden on the Secretary to show that a standard which places
identical requirements on two different types of vehicles meets the
conditions of practicability and satisfies the need for motor vehicle
safety when considered for each vehicle type separately. There is no
assumption that a valid standard for one type of vehicle is still valid
when extended to another type without modification. In particular,
review courts have in effect given convertibles, sports cars, and
retreaded tires protected positions among motor vehicles and tires;
safety standards are not permitted to force these classes of products out
of production by imposing upon them requirements identical to those for
other vehicles or for new tires which they by their nature cannot meet or
thiech would raise their cost so much as to make them unsalable.6" 7
Winlly, the requirement that standards meet the need for motor
vehicle safety puts both upper and lower bounds on standards. On the one
hand, Congress intended that the standards set by the Secretary actually
achieve reductions in traffic injuries and fatalities. Standards that do
not increase safety do not meet the intent of Congress in passing the
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Safety Act. For example, a standard intended only to reduce repair costs
would not be allowed as a motor vehicle safety standard. On the other
hand, not all risks associated with motor vehicles are necessarily unrea-
sonable and the Safety Act associates motor vehicle safety only with
protection from unreasonable risks. Standards can be and have been
challenged in court on the grounds that the risk being reduced by a
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standard was already so small as to not be unreasonable.
Secretary's Initiative
The Safety Act required the Secretary of Transportu:ion to issue
initial safety standards within four months of its enac::nent. Beyond
this requirement, the decision to issue further standards was left to the
Secretary's initiative. A requirement that the set of standards be
updated at least every two years was deleted from the Senate version of
the bill before the law was passed.
There has been some speculation voiced that the Safety Act requires
the Secretary to promulgate a standard if he officially finds that it
meets the five necessary conditions discussed above. lie question has
never been before a court for decision.
Procedure for Issuing Standards
The Safety Act specifies that the Administrative Procedure Actl9
governs the issuing of safety standards. Because of the nature of stan-
dards as rules of general applicability, the Administrative Procedure Act
allows "informal" rulemaking 'procedures for their promulgation. The
procedural requirements in informal rulemaking are minimal. An agency
may, if it chooses to do so, begin the rulemaking proceeding with an
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advance notice of proposed rulemakinv (ANPRM) published in the Federal
Register; the content of an APRM is not set by law, but agencies usually
use one as a general announcement of agency action in a particular area
and as a request for comments and information relevant to that area. The
rulemaking proceeding officially begins with the publication of a notice
of proposed rulemaking (NPRM) in the Federal Register. The NPRM must
explain the purpose of the rulemaking and the subject matter under
consideration. This explaration is supposed to alert potentially
affected parties as to the questions at stake in the rulemaking. The
most common and direct way of doing this is to publish the full text of
the proposed regulation or standard or the text of each alternative under
consideration. After the NPRM is published, the rulemaking agency must
allow interested persons to submit written comments into a public docket
of the proceeding. A final rule is published in the Federal Register
after the agency has considered the comments received. Interested
persons must be given the right to petition for reconsideration of any
final rule.
The intervals between the publication of the NPRM, the closing of
the public docket to further comments, the issuance of the final rule,
and the deadline for petitions for reconsideration may be set by the
agency in charge of the rulemaking. At the option of the agency, oral as
well as written comments may be heard, or a "formal" rulemaking procedure
involving a trial-like public hearing may be followed instead. The
advantages to an agency of informal rulemaking are such that agencies
rarely choose formal rulemaking. Formal rulemaking has been used only
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once. in the development of motor vehicle safety standards; that pro-
ceeding was terminated by the officials in charge before it reached its
conclusion.2 0
The Safety Act-provides for judicial review of new safety standards
in a U.S. court of appeals. Any adversely affected person may petition
for review of a standard within sixty days after the standard is issued.
Judicial review is discussed in more detail in Section 2.2.3.
Enforcement
Manufacturing, selling, etc. a vehicle or item of equipment which
does not comply with applicable federal motor vehicle safety standards is
prohibited by the Safety Act. But the Safety Act does not provide for
prior compliance testing by the Secretary of Transportation. Instead,
manufacturers of vehicles and equipment are required to certify that each
of their products complies with all applicable motor vehicle safety
standards. Selling a vehicle or item of equipment that has not been
certified is prohibited. Certifying a vehicle or item of equipment as
being in compliance without exercising due care to ensure that the certi-
fication is accurate is also prohibited. Testing by the government is
intended to detect violations of these provisions, not to give pre-market
approval to new vehicles and equipment.
The Safety Act established fines for violations of these prohibi-
tions. In addition, U.S. district courts are given the authority to
restrain violations of the Act. Criminal penalties for violations were
proposed on the floors of both Houses of Congress during debate on the
bill, but were defeated in each.
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2.2.2 Testing, Research, and Development
The drafters of the Safety Act recognized that a program of regu-
lation as envisioned in the Act would require a parallel program of
testing, research, and development. First, in order to detect violations
of the Act, the government would need to have the facilities and manpower
to conduct compliance tests on vehicles purchased for that purpose. The
Act authorized the acquisition of such facitilities,' conditioned on
subsequent approval by the relevant congressional commi,::ees, and
directed the Secretary to begin planning for them. Second, the govern-
sent would need to develop its own expertise in automotive technology,
and ould have to create an entirely nev technology of afety regulation,
to be able to write effective standards. To satisfy this need, the
Safety Act gives the Secretary broad authority to conduct research and
development both by the government itself and through grants and
contracts.
-An important historical point is that some of the supporters of the
Safety Act believed that the American automobile manufacturers had not
been pursuing safety-related R&D as aggresively as they should have been
prior to 1966. The provision for a broad government R&D program was
intended in part to stimulate more effort on the part of industry. Ralph
Nader had charged in Unsafe at Any Speed that the manufacturers had used
their dominant position in the industry and in the automotive engineering
pTrofession to actively discourage advances in safety technology.2 1
Nader and like-thinking safety advocates wanted an independent federal
X&D program which could be used as a yardstick by which to measure the
31
R&D efforts of the manufacturars. T.e statutory provisions reflect this
desire on their part.
2.2.3 Judicial Review
As stated earlier, the Safety Act allows adversely affected persons
to petition for judicial review of a new safety standard in a court of
appeals... It would be difficult to overstate the importance of the
judicial review provision and the role of the courts under it. Just as
in a safety standard it is the exact details of the compliance testing
procedure which determine the effective. content of the standard, so in
rulemaking under the Safety Act it is judicial review.which determines
what type of'standards the Secretary is effectively allowed to issue.
The five restrictions discussed in Section 2.2.1 take on meaning and
become compelling only because review courts have the power to invalidate
standards that do not meet them.
Judicial review of' informal agency rulemaking is an irtricate and
evolving area of administrative law. The treatment here will necessarily
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'be simpl istic and sketchy.2 2
The Safety Act itself only states that the "court shall have juris-
diction to review the order in accordance with Section 10 of the Adminis-
trative Procedure Act and to grant appropriate relief as provided in such
section." The referenced section of the Administrative Procedure Act
directs a reviewing court to set aside agency actions, findings, and
conclusions if it finds certain defects with them. In normal situtation,
'i.e., situations where an agency has not violated constitutional provi-.
32
sions or exceeded the authoritv gr.zntedy s tatute, there are three
important defects which may lead to reversal of agency action by a review
court: () the action may not be arbitrary, capricious, or an abuse of
discretion; (2) it must have observed procedures required by law; and (3)
it must be supported by substantial evidence if the case arose from
formal rulemaking or if the case is "reviewable on the basis of a record
of a hearing provided by statute." In cases in which-all three of these
conditions apply, judicial.review is said to use a "substantial evidence"
standard of review. In cases in which only the first two apply, review
is said to use an "arbitrary and capricious" standard of review.
Traditionally, an arbitary and capricious standard of review meant
that a review court would not probe the substantive basis for the factual
determinations on which an agency based its actions; instead the court
was only to review whether the agency had acted with rationality and
consistency. In contrast, a reviewing court using a substantial evidence
standard was obligated to determine whether the factual findings of an-
agency were adequately supported by evidence in the record of the agency
proceeding. The substantial evidence test was thus more probing of the
evidentiary basis for the agency's findings. It did not require that
only the single conclusion made by the agency be possible on the basis of
the evidence; two inconsistent conclusions might be supported by substan-
tial evidence in the same record.
Also traditionally, the substantial evidence standard applied only
in cases of review where formal, trial-like hearings were the means used
by the agency to collect the factual evidence used in its decisions.
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Informal rulemaking, which relies on a variety of sources for the infor-
mation used in developing a rule, was not considered to be subject to
substantial evidence review but instead was reviewed under an arbitrary
and capricious standard. The rationale for this difference was that
formal rulemaking produced a record of evidence that had been tested in
cross examination and was hence in a suitable form for a court to review,
while informal rulemaking tended to produce a disjointed record of
untested statements that were not suitable for factual rview.
Legal traditions change, however, and recently some courts have
interpreted the two standards of review to be very much like in
practice, with both requiring the review court to examine the substantive
evidence supporting agency determinations. In addition, the Supreme
Court has implied that even informal rulemaking is to be reviewed with a
substantial evidence standard, though most courts of appeals that have
reviewed motor vehicle safety standards have professed to be applying an
arbitary and capricious standard. While the question of the appropriate
standard of review is not yet settled, a review court ill generally not
take for granted that all agency findings have been made correctly, but
will examine both the process of consideration followed by the agency and
the evidentiary basis for the conclusions it reached.
When a safety standard is challenged in court, the Secretary of
Transporation has at least the duty to convince the court that the
factual determinations that were the basis for issuing the standard were
not arrived at arbitrarily; if the particular court favors substantial
evidence review the Secretary must as well show that the record of the
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rulemaking contains substantial evidence for those factual determina-
tions. This duty on the part of the Secretary does not, however, neces-
sarily require him to prove that each of the five restrictions on the
content of the standard have been met. Not all of those restrictions are
factual in nature. Some of them are requirements that the Secretary make
and state policy choices. Policy choices are always to be reviewed only
under the arbitrary and capricious standard. The court may ask only
whether the policy choices ere rationally connected to their factual
basis.
In particular, the recuirement that motor vehicle safety standards
meet the need for motor veh:.cle safety requires that a policy decision be
made as to what constitutes unreasonable risk associated with motor
vehicle performance and design. The answer to that question is a matter
of law or policy, not of fact, and the Safety Act in effect leaves it to
the Secretary to make the law. Similarly, the "reasonableness of cost,
feasibility, and adequate '.ead time" which the Secretary must consider
also has policy components. On the other hand, whether a standard regu-
lates performance as opposed to design and whether it is stated in objec-
tive terms are much more factual in nature. The estimated cost of
complying with a standard and the potential reduction in injuries it
might achieve are also likely to be treated as factual questions. The
purpose of judicial review is to serve as a check on the accuracy of
factual findings such as these that may be claimed to be support for
policy choices and on their adequacy to support the rationality of the
policy choices embodied in a safety standard.
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2.3 . Continuing ConRrec.:!n!1 !t-rc: -. Motor Vehicle Safety
Although the Safety Act has remained as the most important
expression on Congressional concern for motor vehicle safety, Congress
has shown a continuing interest during, the years since 1966. This
interest has not been as unanimously supportive of the federal role in
motor vehicle safety regulation as the vote on the Safety Act in 1966,
however. Instead, there has been mixed support for regulation, criticism
of the performance of the Secretaries of Transportation and their
delegatees, and reluctance to fund the regulatory program as completely
as was originally envisioned by the Safety Act supporters.
The Safety Act has been amended by every Congress since its passage,
for a total of five sets of amendments to date. Most of these have been
strengthening or perfecting amendments, initiated by the recognition of
shortcomings in the orginal Act. Some of them have been examples of
Congressional disapproval of the decisions of the Secretary and his
delegatees.
In 1968, provisions were added to require the Secretary to tempo-
rarily exempt very low volume manufacturers from standards in cases of
financial hardship or cases involving research or experimental vehicles.
In 1966 the supporters of the Safety Act had been primarily interested in
regulating the products of the mass manufacturers, The standards issued
under the Act had proven to be inappropriate when applied to newly manu-
factured replicas of old car models and to other custom cars. The
testing requirements of the standards, particularly the destructive
testing of several vehicles, were also said to be a hardship for manufac-
turers who produced only a few hundred vehicles per year.23
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In 1970, the definition of motor vehicle equipment was expanded to
include some items which the Department of Transportation felt needed to
be included in the list of items subject to regulation. Motor vehicle
tires were added to the defect and notification provisions, which had
previously applied only to complete vehicles. The consumer information
provision was claritied to ensure that prospective purchasers as well as
actual purchasers would be able to get information from manufacturers on
the safety performance of competing models. And a provision was added
which required manufacturers to keep records on the purchasers of their
products, so that defect notifications would be possible 24
In 1972, the exemption provisions added in 1968 were substantially
revised. The 1968 amendment had allowed temporary exemptions only for
manufacturers with volumes of less than 500 vehicles per year. The 1972
amendments increased this volume to 10,000 vehicles per year in cases of
financial hardship. The 1972 amendment made possible temporary exemp-
tions for mass produced specialty vehicles like taxi cat,;, funeral
hearses, some recreational vehicles, etc. In addition, :he 1972 amend-
ment expanded the exemption priviliges for research and experimental
vehicles.25
In 1974, the Safety Act was strengthened in several ways. Manufac-
turers were required to notify present owners of vehicles with safety
defects, rather than only first purchasers. They were also required to
remedy defects without charge; previously they had usually done so but
only voluntarily. The list of actions prohibited by the Act was expanded
to include various record keeping and reporting failures. The maximum
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civil penalty for violations was doubled. The Secretary was given
authority to investigate traffic accidents, including authority to
impound and examine vehicles as needed to determine the causes of an
accident. Finally, the Secretary was given authority to require manufac-
turers who opposed proposed or final regulations on the grounds of the
cost of complying to furnish him with the cost data supporting their
claims.26
The 1976 amendments we*'e not substantive; they affected only the
IHTSA's budget authorizaticl.2 7
Congress has not been ntirely satisfied with the way the Secre-
taries have administered t Safety Act. This dissatisfaction has been
expressed in law several times. In the amendments of 1970, over the
Secretary's protest, Congress set a deadline for the issuance of a safety
standard for retreaded tires. In 1974 it did the same for eight aspects
of school bus safety. In 'the same year it ratified into law a standard
that the Secretary had rec.ntly established for the crash integrity of
vehicle fuel systems and prohibited him from amending it towards lower
safety performance. This was the.outcome of dissatisfaction with the
pace of the rulemaking in this area and a desire to preclude a delay in
the effective date of the standard and possible weakening of its require-
ments. Also in 1974, the Safety Act was amended to require the Secretary
to respond affirmatively or negatively within four months to all
petitions for the start of a rulemaking or defect investigation
procedure. Previously, there was no deadline for the Secretary to
respond to petitions. The amendment as originally introduced into the
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House would have allowed petitioners whnse etitions were denied by the
Secretary to file suit in a district court for a de novo trial of the
merits of their petitions. This stronger version better showed the
dissatisfaction of the amendment's sponsors with the priorities set by
the Secretary.
In addition to amendments to the Safety Act, oversight subcommittees
in both the House and Senate have repeatedly urged the Secretary and his
delegatees to be more vigo:r-us, both in motor vehicle safety regulation
in general and in particular areas of rulemaking.
The most notable exam;)le of divergence between the Secretary and
Congress was one in which Congress reversed an existing safety standard
rather than pressured for a new one. This occurred in October 1974, when
the amendments to the Safety Act repealed a portion of a standard which
required ignition-seat belt interlocks on model year 1974 and later
automobiles. At the same time, Congress put a new provision into the Act
specifying the use of more elaborate administrative procedures than
normal in any future rulemaking aimed at requiring occupant restraint
systems other than conventional seat belts. Congress also retained for
itself the right to overrule the result of such a rulemaking by joint
resolution.
The Secretaries of Transportation have been less than completely
successful with the committees that appropriate funds for the administra-
tion of the Safety Act. The compliance testing and R&D facility which
the Secretary was authorized to plan and acquire has never received
approval and funding. Consequently the Department of Transportation does
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not have all the in-house tcchnicl pen-rse, manpower, and facilities
that were envisioned in 1966 by the supporters.of the Safety Act.
Instead it relies heavily on contracts with independent testing labs,
highway research institutes associated with several' universities, other
government agencies, and private consultants. The Department does lease
some building and test ground from the State of Ohio for use in defects
testing. In addition it operates the Safety Research-Laboratory, once
part of the National Bureau of Standards. Congressional appropriations
committees have refused to fund at least one major research project, for
the installation of crash recorders in a large fleet of automobiles.
2.4 The National Highway Traffic Safety Administration
The National Traffic and Motor Vehicle Safety Act of 1966 gave the
responsibility for issuing and enforcing safety standards to the Secre-
tary of Commerce and established the National Traffic Safety Agency
vithin the Department of Commerce to assist the Secretary. The companion
National Highway Safety Act established the National Highway Safety
Agency, also within the Department of Commerce, to administer programs of
federal assistance and direction of state efforts in safe highway main-
tenance and operation, traffic law enforcement, driver registration and
training, etc. When the Department of Transportation was created shortly
after passage of the Acts, the Secretary of Transportation was given the
role originally assigned to the Secretary of Commerce and the two
agencies were transferred to the new Department and redesignated as
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Bureaus. Within months they were co-;n-A by executive order into a
single National Highway Safety Bureau under the Federal Highway
Administration. In 1970 the Secretary of Transportation, with the
consent of Congress', elevated the Bureau to the status of a separate
operating administration within the Department of Transportation. The
Bureau was given its present name, the National Highway Traffic Safety
Administration (NHTSA). The Administrator of the NHTGA is a political
appointee responsible to the Secretary.
The Secretary has delegated to the Administrator of the NHTSA his
responsibilties under the National Traffic and Motor Vehicle Safety-Act,
the National Highway Safety Act, and the Motor Vehicle Information and
29Cost Savings Act. The NHTSA is also responsible for the administra-
tion of mandatory fuel economy standards under Title III of the Energy
Policy and Conservation Act of 1975.30 Thus motor vehicle safety
regulation is only one of many responsibilities of the NHTSA. Within
motor vehicle safety, setting standards for new automobiles is also only
one of many of the NHTSA's responsibilities. The NHTSA sets standards
for other vehicle classes, such as trucks, buses, and motorcycles. It
also operates programs of standards enforcement and defect investigation
for all vehicle classes.
Figure 2.1 shows the most recent NHTSA organization chart. The
NHTSA has undergone several reorganizations and will no doubt continue to
For convenience, the name "NHTSA" will be used to refer to both the
NHTSA itself and its predecessors, and for the Secretary of Transporta-
tion when discussing duties that have been delegated to the Administrator
of the NHTSA by the Secretary.
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do so. To date, however, each reorganization has left intact three key
program offices: the Offices of Motor Vehicle Programs, Traffic Safety
Programs, and Research and Development. The Office of Traffic Safety
Programs is concerned with administering the programs of federal aid to
states under the National Highway Safety Act; it has no activities
relating to safety standards for new vehicles. The Office of Motor
Vehicle Programs administers the safety standards, compliance, and defect
programs. The Office of Research and Development administers the R&D
program which provides technical support for both the Motor Vehicle
Programs and Traffic Safety Programs Offices. The Office of Research and
Development also conducts and contracts for NHTSA R&D programs that are
not specifically in response to expressed needs of the other two program
offices. The Office of Automotive Fuel Economy is a recent addition; it
administers the NHTSA's responsibilities under the Energy Policy and
Conservation Act. In addition to these four program offices the NHTSA
has various other offices responsible for program direction and
coordination and for staff and administrative support services, as shown
on the organization chart. The NHTSA also has regional offices that
serve mainly as liaison with state highway and traffic safety agencies
and as public affairs representatives.
The NHTSA is a relatively small agency. Its-budget authority is
about that of the Federal Communications Commission, the Securities
Exchange Commission, or the Interstate Commerce Commission. -Its staff is
one-tenth as large as that of the Environmental Protection Agency. The
Food and Drug Administration also dwarfs the NHTSA, both in staff and
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FIGURE 2.1
National Highway Traffic Safety Administration
Organization Chart
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budget.3 2 In fiscal year 1977 the :,,TA ado 918 authorized positions
in its staff and had a total program level f.about $218 million. But
$129 million of this amount consisted of grants to state and local
governments for highway safety programs. The Office of Motor Vehicle
Programs had a staff of about 200. The NHTSA's entire contract program
for both vehicle and other research was about $32 million. In-house R&D
expenses, including contract monitoring, came toI about $5 million.3
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TEN YEARS OF REGULATION: OVERVIEW
In 1966 there was a range of expectations held as to what the new
regulatory regime would accomplish. The intention of some safety advo-
cates was that federal regulation would correct the failure of the auto-
mobile manufacturing indust:ry to build safer cars. Changes in the design
and performance of automot les were to be forced upon the manufacturers
through federal motor vehic:le safety' standards. Traditional industry
practices, which had allegedly subordinated safe design to considerations
of acceleration performance and style, were to replaced at least in part
by safety standards designed by an expert regulatory agency. Not all of
the congressmen who voted in favor of the 1966 Safety Act shared this
expectation of recurrent mroduct changes planned by bureaucrats and
executed by industry. It ould not be unreasonable to suppose that many
congressmen viewed the 1966 Safety Act primarily as a way to get a
limited one-time improvement in automobile safety rather than as the
start of a vigorous and continuing program of federal intervention in
industry design practices.
The following sections give a brief overview of the last ten years
of automobile safety regulation and of what effect it has had on auto-
motive technology. The overview is by no means a complete history of
automobile safety regulation. Although the NHTSA is a relatively small
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agency and has duties other than safet rul.ation, in ten years it has
been able to process a great deal of rulemaking. Not all of the detail
of that rulemaking can be reviewed here. In particular rulemaking con-
cerned with trucks, buses, and motorcycles is not mentioned.
3.1 Standards Issued
There have been thirty-six safety stancdards issued which affect new
automobiles. In addition, there have been amendments to these stan-
dards, some of which have changed the requirements of the original stan-
dards to such an extent that they should be discussed as though they were
separate standards. It is convenient, and not misleading, to cate-
gorize the standards and amendments into three historical groups.
3.1.1 Initial Standards and Immediate Additions
The drafters of the 1966 Safety Act had in mind particular existing
-standards that would serve as the basis for the initial federal motor
vehicle safety standards. It was anticipated that the current General
Services Adminstration (GSA) standards for government-purchased
-vehicles, 2 existing federal standards for brake fluids and seat belts,
existing state standards for the installation of seat belts, and volun-
.tary industry standards, particularly those of the Society of Automotive
-Engineers (SAE), would be used as sources for the new standards.
The twenty-four standards listed and described in Table 3.1 are
-those that were derived from these sources. Twenty of these were issued.
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together in January 1967, just four months after passage of the Safety
Act; the remaining four, and an amendment to MVSS 108 extending it to
automobiles, were delayed and issued somewhat later.
The first twenty standards followed closely the requirements of the
GSA and SAE standards. The GSA standards themselves either were based on
SAE standards or were specifications for features that were already
optional on most models. The domestic manufacturers had announced in
1965 that they would incorporate most of the GSA requirenents as standard
features in 1966 and 1967 models. Thus, the first twen:y standards,
effective with the 1968 models, did not contain any significant new
requirements. Many simply codified existing features.
Of the four other standards in this category, MVSS 109 and MVSS 110
adopted an existing voluntary standard of the Rubber Manufacturers Asso-
ciation. The impact of these two standards was felt by the tire manufac-
turers rather than by the automobile manufacturers. MVSS 116 was a
recodification of the existing mandatory federal standard for brake
fluids. The head restraint standard, MVSS 202, made mandatory a device
which had previously been optional with some models, but it set new
dimensional and strength requirements. Compliance with the standard
required new designs and retooling by all manufacturers. The amendment
to MVSS 108 required side marker lights and reflectors; the GSA standard
from which it was derived had only required one or the other.
The standards in this category took some of the best practices of
the domestic manufacturers, upgraded them in a few cases, and made them
mandatory on all model lines and all manufacturers, including foreign
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manufacturers. The fact that the twenty-four standards all had prece-
dents in industry practice does not mean that they placed no burden on
the manufacturers. Product redesign and retooling were needed to incor-
porate previous options on all product lines and to meet the few com-
pletely new requirements in the standards. Foreign manufacturers were
atfected by the standards more severely than the domestic manufacturers
since most had not been involved in the voluntary incorporation of the
GSA features and their home countries had not started atlf similar regu-
latory program.' The twenty-four standards were also thet first for which
compliance was required by law. The industry had previously treated the
SAE standards as design guidelines only; some of them wre only meant to
be specifications for equipment and parts bought by the vehicle manufac-
turers from smaller supply firms. The voluntary incorporation of the GSA
features was also without enforcement. The Safety Act, however, required
manufacturers to certify every vehicle as complying with the standards.
Where previously a manufacturer might have some vehiclei fall short
because of production variations and design inaccuracies, now the manu-
facturer had to adjust design target upwards to compensate for such
variations. In addition, certifying compliance of vehicles required
formal testing, both destructive and nondestructive, and elaborate record
keeping.3
These twenty-four standards are not typical of the overal'l federal
regulatory effort. The technical basis for their content was for the
most part already at hand. The devices and design techniques needed to
allow compliance with their requirements had been accumulated over
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TABLE 3.1
Initial Safety Standards and Immediate Additions
Standard Date Issued Title
Number Date Effective Description
101 1-31-67 Control Location, Identification
1- -b8 and Illumination
102 do Transmission Shift Lever Sequence, Starter
Interlock, Transmission Braking Effect
103 do Windshield Defrosting and Defogging
104 do Windshield Wiping and Washing Systems
105 do Hydraulic Brake Systems
Requires split brake system and
failure warning lights, sets
stopping distances.
106 do Brake Hoses
'107 do Reflecting Surfaces
Requires dull finish on certain
surfaces.
108 do Lamps, Reflective Devices and Assoc. Equip.
Requirements for trucks and
buses.
111 .do Rearview Mirrors
201 -do Occupant Protection In Interior Impact
Requires padding in certain locations,
sets performance criteria for it.
203 do Impact Protection for the Driver
Requires collapsible steering control.
204 do Steering Control Rearward Displacement
Limits rearward displacement in
frontal crash at 30 mph.
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TABLE 3.1
Initial Safety Standards and Immediate Additions
Continued
Standard Date Issued Title
Number Date Effective Description
205 do Glazing Material
Requires high penetration resistant
windshield glass.
206 do Door Locks and Door Retent-on Components
Static strength requirements for locks
hinges, and safety l:ches.
207 do Seating Systems
Static strength requ rements on seat
anchorages.
208 do Occupant Crash Protection
Requires installation of lap and
shoulder belts meeting Standard 209.
209 do Seat Belt Assemblies
Static strength and other requirements.
210 do Seat Belt Assembly Achorases
Location and static strength for seat
belt attachment points.
211 do Wheel Nuts, Wheel Discs, and Hub Caps
Bans spinner-type hub caps.
301 do Fuel System Integrity
Limits leakage in frontal crash.
109 11- 8-67 New Pneumatic Tires
1 -1-68
110 11- 1-67 Tire Selection and Rims
4- 1-68 Requires tires meeting Standard 109
as original equipment.
202 2-12-68 Head Restraints
1- 1- 9 Requires installation and sets location
and static strength criteria.
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TABLE 3.1
Initial Safety Standards and Immediate Additions
Continued
Standard Date Issued
Number Date Effective
Title
Description
12-16-67
1- 1-69
Lamps, Reflective Devices, and Assoc. Equip.
Extended to include automobiles.
Requires side marker lamps and re-
flectors'and hazard warning flashers,
plus usual lighting and signal lamps
Date of effect for most requirements. Manufacturers were given a
choice between side marker reflectors and side marker lamps until 1-1-70.
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Amend
108
decades of industry research and product improvement. The disruption to
-normal industry practice was of only slight to moderate significance.4
The political momentum of the recent passage of the Safety Act helped
carry the NHTSA past obstacles to rulemaking that later became more
troublesome. The only serious difficulties encountered were with MVSS
201, on 'interior padding. There the NHTSA attempted to combine very
stringent requirement with vague performance terminologr,and to defend
the attempt in the only formal rulemaking proceeding it 'ias ever begun.
.The attempt ended with the retraction of the contested roposals.5
3.1.2 Minor Subsequent Standards
Table 3.2 describes eight standards that are subsequent in the sense
that the GSA and SAE standards were not the sources for their concepts
mand-requirements. They therefore represent a different, later phase of
the regulatory efort. The standards have been denoted minor here
'because each regulates only an optional accessory, affects only localized
parts of an automobile, or could be complied with using technology that
'was well known and in scattered use at the time it was is'sued.
'MVSS 112 on headlamp concealment devices, MVSS 113 on hood'latch
3ystems, and MVSS 124 on accelerator control systems were issued to
*orrect specific safety hazards that were newly coming to the attention
f -the NHTSA. MVSS 118 on power windows and MVSS 302 on fabric flam-
-mability were issued to deal with problems that had been recognized for
· some time. MVSS 212 on windshield mounting eliminated designs on some
foreign models which had allowed the windshield to pop out of its moun-
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TABI 3.2
Minor Subsequent Safety Standards
Standard Date Issued
Number Date Effective
Title
Description
Headlamp Concealment Devices
Requires fail-safe operation of
headlamp concealment devices.
Hood Latch Systems
Requires two-position latch system
or two independent latch systems.
Theft Protection
Steering wheel lock, reminder buzzer.
Vehicle Identification Number
Requires VIN to be visible on
dashboard.
Windshield Mounting
Requires retention of windshield in
30 mph frontal crash.
Power-Operated Window Systems
Prevents side windows from operating
when ignition key is not present.
Flammability of Interior Materials
Sets flammability criteria for interior
fabric and trim.
Accelerator Control Systems
Requires fail-safe design for automatic
speed control devices.
Seat Belts
Standardized buckles, required one-
piece design for lap and shoulder com-
bination, added convenience features.
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112
113
114
115
212
:118
4-24-68
1- 1-69
4-24-68
4-24-68
-T 1-70
7- 3-68
i - 1-69
8-13-68
I- 1-7
17-17-70
rF2- I 17T
302
124
.Amend.
208 &
209
12-31-70
-9- 1-72
.3-31-72
9:- -73
various
various
ting on impact before it could serve to help absorb the kinetic energy of
unrestrained occupants or retain them inside the vehicle; most domestic
models met the requirements of the standard before it was issued. MVSS
114 and 115 were developed by the NHTSA in conjunction with the Depart-
ment of Justice. The features required by MVSS 114 were found at the
time only on some domestic and German models and had to be newly
integrated into the steering and ignition systems of other models. The
set of amendments to MVSSs 208 and 209 which affected seat belt design
were issued over a period of several years. Some were part of rulemaking
directed specifically at seat belts while others were part of passive
restraint rulemaking. The effect of the amendments was to standardize
seat belt design so as to reduce user problems caused by unfamiliarity
and to make certain convenience features mandatory in an effort to
increase seat belt usage.
Some minor amendments to other standards could also be included in
this category. They and the standards that are listed here were the
outcome of unremarkable rulemaking, the process of which does not merit
special comment here.
3.1.3 Major Subsequent Standards
The four-standards and three major amendments listed in Table 3.3
deserve the designation major for several reasons. Some set performance
requirements that are not restricted in scope to localized parts of the
car or to individual pieces of equipment, in contrast to standards in the
6last category. Some have been major cost items; and some attempt to
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deal with important safety problems. Together they and their histories
are the most interesting of all the standards that deal with auto-
mobiles. The discussion of the standards here will be briefer than they
deserve.
MVSS 214 requires a static crush performance test for side doors,
intended to increase protection in side impact collisions. The standard
has had the effect of making mandatory a combination of door beams and
reinforced pillars that was developed and first introduced by General
Motors on its own initiative. The process of rulemaking on this standard
took slightly less than eleven months to complete, from :irst NPRM to
final rejection of petitions for reconsideration.
The exterior protection standard, MVSS 215 is actually a bumper
standard. The standard has caused substantial, and relatively expensive,
changes in bumper design. It standardized the height of bumpers and led
to the energy-absorbing designs that are now common. The standard added
about $136 to car prices in model year 1974, the year i:s requirements
7
first affected both front and rear bumpers. Rulemakin on the stan-
dard was in progress from 1970 to 1975.
MVSS 219 was developed in three rulemaking steps from mid 1972 to
aid 1975.. The standard sets performance requirements which prohibit the
angine lid and other parts of a car from penetrating through its wind-
jhi-eld -in a frontal crash at 30 mph. Compliance with the standard
required reinforcement of existing engine lids and attaching hardware on
those models which did not already comply.
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The hydraulic brake amendment to H'VSS i05 introduced more stringent
stopping distance requirements to replace the old SAE-based ones and
added new requirements for brake pedal forces, brake fade, and wet brake
recovery. Rulemaking for the standard began in 1970 and continued into
1976; the many details of the amendment were worked out in a complex
series of petitions and responses over this period.
The fuel system integrity amendments to MVSS 301 'were five years in
the making; the final version was settled in March 1974. The amendments
added side, rear, and rollover tests to the initial MVSS 301 which had
only contained a requirement for frontal crashes. The new requirements
became fully effective with the 1977 model year..
The passive restraint amendment to MVSS 208 is now in its second
life.8 The amendment began as a proposal in 19'70 and was rushed
through an extraordinarily complex sequence of petitions, proposals, and
revisions until - and even after - it was published in its final form
in early 1972. The amendment in that form was remanded to the NHTSA by a
court of appeals in late 1972 for correction of deficiencies in the
specifications for the test dummy that was to have been used in com-
pliance testing. Between then and 1976 the only related agency rule-
making actions were the issuance of the revised dummy specifications and
the reproposal of passive restraint requirements that were never made
final. In 1976 then-Secretary of Transportation William Coleman took
control of the rulemaking from the Administrator of the NHTSA. The
Secretary decided against issuing a passive restraint requirement at the
time,9 but managed to arrange agreements with several manufacturers for
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TABLE 3.3
Major Subsequent Safety Standards
Standard Date Issued
Number Date Effective
Title
Description
10-22-70
1- 1-73
4- 9-71
9- 1-76 ' ~_
12- 3-717 9-155
6- 9-75
9- 1-72
9- 2-72
1- 1-76
8-20-73
9- 1-75
3-21-74
9- 1-76
various
various
Side Door Strength
Static crush strength criteria for
doors.
Exterior Protection Standard
Standardizes heights f bumpers, sets
damage criteria for 5 and 2.5 mph
impacts.
Roof Crush Resistance
Static crush strength criteria for
portion of rodf near windshield.
Windshield Zone Intrusion
Sets criteria for intrusion
of hood and other parts into zone
needed to allow for safe deformation
of windshield struck by occupant.
Hydraulic Brake Systems
Shortens stopping di,:ances for normal
and failed brakes. Iids brake fade
criteria. Limits pedal force.
Fuel System Integrity
Adds static roll-over test after front
crash test.
Fuel System Integrity
Adds front angular, rear, and side
crash tests, each with roll-over.
Occupant Crash Protection
Converts the seat belt installation
standard to a passive restraint
standard.
* Date given is that of issuance of the tirst version of standard or
amendment. Modifications continued after this date.
r* Date given is that of the effective date for full requirements of
standard or amendment. Requirements took effect in steps.
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214
215
216
219
Amend.
105
Amend.
301
Amend.
301
Amend.
208 '
__
a voluntary large-scale demcn:tr'-4t n prcgrcm of passive restraints
before he left office in January 1977. His successor, Brock Adams,
abrogated these agreements and has recently issued the passive restraint
amendment in its second final form.1l It now is less stringent in
several ways than the earlier form. If the amendment survives review by
Congress and a possible but improbable court review, passive restraints
will be introduced during model years 1982 through 1.984, starting with
large cars and ending with small cars.
MVSS 216 was issued dring the development of the first passive
restraint amendment as an interim measure to improve the roll-over crash
integrity of roof structures until provisions in the.planned passive
restraint amendment on the same subject took effect. · The standard has
been in effect since then and will no doubt remain, as the present pas-
sive restraint rule does not require rollover tests. When it was issued
the standard necessitated minor reinforcement of the windshield header
and front roof pillars in :ars that did not already meet its static crush
strength requirements.
3.2 Standards Not Issued
There have been a great many areas of automobile safety in which the
NHTSA has begun rulemaking or research but in which it has not yet issued
any safety standards or upgraded existing standards. In some of these
areas, notices of proposed rulemaking were published and then withdrawn
or left pending indefinitely. In other areas, extensive -research pro-
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jects have been conducted and described as intended to support eventual
rulemaking. These proposals and research projects have been as much a
part of the last ten years of regulation as have the standards that were
actually issued. Some of them are briefly described here.
Lighting and Signaling
In .1970 the NHTSA began rulemaking on a major revision of MVSS 108,
relying in part on the findings and recommendations of its research
contractors and on comments to an ANPRM it had issued jtt previously.
The NPRM for revision was published in October 1972. It proposed major
changes in front lighting and less radical but still sigllificant changes
in rear signaling.
In the area of rear signaling the notice proposed a requirement that
brake lamps be physically separated from other rear amps and spaced
apart from them by at least a specified distance. The relative positions
of tail, brake, and turn signal lamps were to be restricted to only a few
arrangements. This was a change from the existing prov ions or MVSS
108, which allowed all three signal lamps to be combined behind a single
lens. The agency proposed to replace the traditional two-beam
headlighting systems with three-beam systems which its research
contractors recommended as better compromises between increased
illumination and increased glare.
The NHTSA withdrew the NPRM in April 1974, after encountering tech-
nical criticism and resistance from manufacturers. Since then the agency
has conducted more research in both front lighting and rear signaling.
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The NHTSA obviously continued development on a new version of at least
the rear signal portion of the withdrawn NPRM, but by the 1975 annual
report it was no longer listing this as an area of activity.
Visibility
In January 1971 the NHTSA published an NPRM for new indirect
visibility requirements, to be incorporated into MVSS 111 by amendment.
The agency explained the rationale for the new requirements in terms of
the field of view requirements needed in lane changing nd other
maneuvers. The requirements of the proposed amendment ere to take
effect in two steps. The first step could have been satisfied with
upgraded rearview mirror systems. The second step seemed to leave
through-the-roof periscope devices as the only obvious means of com-
pliance. The proposal, especially the second step requirements, was
severely criticized by automobile manufacturers.
A companion NPRM was published in April 1972 dealing with direct
fields of view. The proposal was stringent enough that it would have
forced redesign of the bodies of many car models. Some of its provisions
could be interpreted to be design restrictions rather than performance
requirements. This proposal was also met with resistance from manu-
facturers.
The NHTSA withdrew both visibility NPRMs in 1973 and announced that
new proposals would come before any standards were issued. The reason it
gave was that it was undertaking further research programs in both
areas. It did, but no new proposals have followed from the research.
62
High Speed Limitation
In December 1970 a proposal was publish'ed for a new safety standard
on speed limitation. The proposal set a maximum attainable speed of 95
mph, required automatic activation of warning flashers and horns above 81
mph, and restricted the labeling of speedometers so that they would not
indicate any speed higher than 85 mph. Reaction from individual citizens
was predominately adverse to the proposal.1 Three years later the
agency remarked in a request for comments that the practicability of the
first two requirements had not been established but that it was still in-
terested in the third. Another two years later, in AugJst 1976, it pub-
lished a new NPRM containing the third requirement and some new proposals
on odometers. This notice was withdrawn but quickly republished and is
now pending.
Pedestrian Protection
The NHTSA has conducted broad research on pedestrian safety, in-
cluding the role of automobiles in pedestrian injury csation and miti-
gation, since 1967. In October of that year it issued n ANPRM that
vaguely contemplated regulation of all external protrusions and contours
on automobiles. In December of the same year it proposed a new standard
that would have regulated hood-type ornamental protrusions only by set-
ting maximum breakaway loads for them. This proposal was not followed by
a rule. In its 1971 Program Plan the agency expressed an intention to
regulate protection in performance terms, possibly by using a test dummy
as it was then planning to use for passive restraint performance
tests.1 3 Since 1971 the agency has continued to work on the develop-
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ment of a standard of this type, apparently without much success.
Other Areas
There are other areas of automobile safety that are sometimes
mentioned in critiques of the existing set of standards. The NHTSA has
proposed dynamic testing of seat belts using test dummies in the same way
that passive restraints will be tested, but has never made final a
requirement. It has recognized that adjustable head restraints, allowed
under the initial version of MVSS 202, were not being acjusted properly
in many cases and as a result were not giving the expected protection
from whiplash injuries; although some models have integrated seat backs
and head restraints that do not require adjustment, the NHTSA has made no
move to require this for all models. There are several performance tests
that now use static forces that could be converted to dynamic performance
tests using more realistic barrier crashes. The fabric flammability
requirements of MVSS 302 have been claimed to be inadequate. There are
several important standards for automobiles which do nc,: apply to other
vehicles frequently used for personal transportation; f:'is lack of
coverage also has been criticized.
:3.3 Appraisal
The safety technology that is now used in automobiles is remarkably
similar to what it was in 1968, the first year that federal safety regu-
lations were in effect. The standards applicable that year, and four
standards applicable slightly later, had in effect been imposed by
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Congress itself rather than by the NRTSA. 1968 should be the base year
for judging the accomplishments of the continuing program of regulation.
Bumpers, brakes, and fuel systems are now designed to meet requirments
very different froni those in 1968. Side doors are also, but that was a
change introduced by General Motors and only made universal by regula-
tion. Passive restraints, when and if the recent amendment takes effect,
with be the first example of a completely new device .being forced into
use by regulation, unless one counts the ignition interlock as having
been in this category.
The regulatory regime has been fairly successful in getting changes
made in localized parts of the vehicle, and in correcting many seemingly
minor or unusual safety problems. A distinguishing feature of changes in
this category -- accelerator control systems, hood latches, power win-
dows, steering column locks,etc. - is that they were easily integrated
into the surrounding, unchanged vehicle. Changes that would have
affected large portions of the vehicle, as would have the direct
visibility proposal for example, have not occurred. Nor have changes
that would have radically altered the appearance of automobiles, for
example the periscope implied by the indirect visiblity proposal. The
bumper and fuel system standards are located somewhere between these two
extremes of easily integrated and broadly disruptive changes. They were
accomplished only after extended rulemaking proceedings.
The effect of safety standards on the cost of an automobile has been
noticeable, but not large. The most recent available estimates of the
cumulative costs are in the range of $320 per automobile, 4 an amount
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often spent on accessories alone.* This does not include the effects of
the fuel system integrity amendments, but these are expected to be
small.9 The adoption of air bags to meet the passive restraint
requirements will cause this figure to double by some estimates, to
increase by a third by other estimates.20 The safety impact of the
standards taken together has also been significant. The General
Accounting Office has estimated that the chance; of surviving an accident
have been increased by about 25 percent over that for p-1966 models,
21-
but due mostly just to the initial standards. The rediction in the
thances of having an accident are unknown because of me;l3urement
difficulties, but is presumably positive as well:
The process of regulation has not been smooth or cordial, especially
for the major subsequent standards. The extended passive restraint
rulemaking has been the most bitter. There have been long unexplained
delays in some rulemaking cases, and prolonged indecision in some
others. Regulatory.activities have not been confined tc the NHTSA. The
Secretary of Transportation, the Wh: House, the Congress, and the
courts have all become involved.
The degree of federal control over automobile design achieved during
a decade of safety regulation and the exercise of that control may have
exceeded what the automobile manufacturers expected when they conceded
In the model year (1974) used in the estimate of the cost of afety
standards, air conditioning as an option cost from $400 to $450 and
was Ecluded in 68% of new cars sold. yinyl tops were from $100 to
$150 and were included on 47% of sales.
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defeat in 1966 and reluctantly supported tile establishment of the regu-
latory regime. They have certainly not been resigned to each exercise of
federal control over the last ten years. Safety advocates, on their
part, have been disappointed with the results and non-results of regu-
lation, as they have repeatedly made clear.2 2 - 2 5 In its last program
plan, issued in 1971, the NHTSA described its intentions for new and
revised safety standards.2 The agency's accomplishments in the
intervening years seem limited compared to its own ambitious goals as
expressed in that program lan. The difficulties encountered in the
process of regulation have been greater than anyone expected in 1966.
The process and substance of automobile safety regulation should not
be judged only in comparison to expectations that were held by one or
another of the participants in the creation of the regulatory regime. To
do so would be uncharitable to the individuals who have operated the
regulatory regime in the face of problems that were not anticipated by
those who helped to create it. It would be overly considerate of some of
the latter individuals, whose expectations and intentions at the time
were poorly formulated and less than rational. And most importantly, it
would provide little insight into important practical problems that
automobile safety regulation shares with other regulatory efforts.
The following chapters examine the process and results of the last
decade of regulation on their own merits. Chapter 4 reconsiders the
stated goals-of regulation and the disparities and correspondences
between them and what economic theory suggests in their stead. Chapter 4
also takes a careful look at technological change, which automobile
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safety regulation seeks to achieve. Chapters 5 and 6 consider what has
happened as the NHTSA, the agency to which has been assigned the task of
achieving the goals of the regulatory regime, has gone about trying to do
so. In contrast to the present chapter, Chapters 5 and 6 deal more with
the process of regulation and the problems inherent in it than with its
outcome as such. In doing so, however, it becomes possible to better
compare what has been accomplished with what might have been.
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CHAPTER FOLR
RE-EXAMINATION OF THE OBJECTIVES OF REGULATION
The Safety Act established the institutions and the mechanism by
which centrally made decisions could replace decisions previously made by
automobile manufacturers and buyers. Congress was not so clear on what
was to be done with the new mechanism, however. The struggle in 1966 was
over whether the Secretary of Transportation would be allowed to set
mandatory standards or whether reliance would be placed on voluntarism,
and over whether once given authority the Secretary would be required to
use it or would be given complete discretion. Attention was focused on
the near term possiblities of the GSA and SAE standards. Objectives that
could be used to guide regulation for years afterwards were not very well
formulated.. Obviously, it is impossible to judge how ,!ll regulation has
performed without an understanding of what it was supposed to do and what
it should have been supposed to do. The following sections discuss these
questions.
4.1 Programmed Objectives vs. Ad Hoc Decisionmaking
There is evidence which might suggest the existence of a predeter-
mined or programmed goal for automobile safety regulation, some level of
safety it was supposed to achieve. It has often been said that the goal
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of automobile safety regulation is to stop the "carnage on the high-
ways". The preamble to the Safety Act clearly states the law's purpose
to be the reduction of traffic accidents, deaths, and injuries. Con-
gress declared a "need for motor vehicle safety" which standards are
supposed to meet. Standards must be stated in performance terms, which
suggests that it is some level of safety performance that is the object
of issuing standards. The "appropriateness" clause was explained by the
Senate Commerce Committee to mean that different types of automobiles
would not necessarily have to meet the same requirements, "so long as all
motor vehicles met basic minimum standards."1 The statements of the
NHTSA since passage of the Act are imilar. The NHTSA has always viewed
the reduction of traffic deaths and injuries as its official mission, to
be accomplished 'through both its vehicle and highway safety programs.
Early in its life, it set a goal for itself of a one-third reduction in
the traffic death rate.2 A more recent NHTSA working order on program
planning states the agency's preference for planning goals expressed
directly in terms of reductions in fatalities and injuries.3 The
magnitude of highway losses, which could be called a carnage on the
national scale, is referred as unacceptable in reports by the NHTSA and
in statements of witnesses before congressional committees. The NHTSA
sometimes speaks of the necessity of reducing traffic fatalities to a
"bearable level".4 From evidence like this it would be reasonable to
conclude that either a reduction in highway losses to a zero level or
perhaps to a specific "bearable" or "reasonable" level is the 'programmed
goal of the regulatory regime.
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'It is clear that in 19A the stiprtorq of the Safety Act were unsat-
isfied with the types of automobiles that were being produced and wanted
safer cars that would reduce traffic losses. In 1966 there were many
types of automobiles that the manufacturers could have been producing,
only a relatively few of which were in actual production. Some of those
that were in production were safer than others. And some that were not
in production but could have been would also have been safer. Thus,
movement towards more safety was possible. The same has been true
since. But changes in vehicle design that increase safety can also be
expected to increase cost. Some changes in design can be made with no
additional manufacturing cost if timed to coincide with normal redesign
and retooling. Even these types of changes might require reductions in
the attractiveness and convenience of automobiles, which are equivalent
to an increase in cost from the point of view of a car buyer and user.
The supply of such costless changes would eventually be depleted, and
reliance would have to be placed on changes that require more steel,
padding, etc. Greater safety would then come only with increasingly
greater cost. If an unbounded movement towards safer cars is begun,
eventually the wisdom of indefinitely greater safety as a goal of regula-
tion collapses into absurdity. Clearly no one in Congress would have
insisted that traffic deaths were going to be eliminated entirely.
To claim that there is a specific level of safety that is the goal of
regulation avoids the absurdity, but still begs the question since no
specific level has ever been claimed to be the goal. The NHTSA's one-
third reduction was to be only the start of the effort; the agency never
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suggested that that reduction would be sufficient. It could be said that
regulation is intended to increase safety only to the point at which the
public is protected from unreasonable risks. But reason is an individual
faculty and consensus on a collective definition of unreasonable risk has
not been achieved. The stated goals of regulation seem nothing more than
poorly formulated symbolism disguising the true ill-defined ad hoc nature
of the regulatory regime.
An ad hoc approach, one in which decisions are made on individual
standards rather than on an overall goal for the regulatory program, is
not necessarily ill-defined, however. An ad hoc approach is workable if
a criterion of desirability exists and can be used to the judge the
desirability of possible movements towards greater safety. The objective
of regulation would then be to take advantage of desirable changes in
safety by issuing standards that would force those changes into prac-
tice. The criterion, of course, should respond to both the attractive
and unattractive consequences of each proposed standard. There would
still be a question as to whether any desirable changes are possible,
i.e., whether there are any opportunities of which regulation can take
advantage.
The drawback of an ad hoc approach is that it can overlook changes
that could have been considered more desirable than any of those that are
considered at one time. An ad hoc approach does not necessarily mean
that decisions are made on one proposal at a .time, however. A set of
proposals may be considered together. The approach does mean that
decisions are made on alternatives for action rather than on a final goal.
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There is a point of view that fits in well with such an ad hoc inter-
pretation of regulation. This is that the safety of automobiles is a
matter that affects the public interest, that the political process --
subject to constitutional constraints - is the legitimate resolver of
matters affecting the public interest, and that the Safety Act did not so
much define the public interest as indicate the direction in which it lay
and establish the mechanism and institutions through which the political
process would decide the desirability of particular standards as they
were proposed. Under one variant of this view, the Administrator of the
NHTSA is the legitimate finder of the public interest in matters of
automobile safety. In another variant, Congress merely gave to the NHTSA
the task of doing the technical and procedural details of regulation,
requested it to work towards indefinitely greater safety, and then stood
ready to overrule individual standards which it, Congress, decided were
not desirable, or not in the public interest. Congress would be able to
do so because of its direct ties back to the electorate. The essence of
this perspective is that the substance of regulation is desirable if the
process of regulation follows legitimate procedures.
This political perspective is difficult to refute on its own terms.
It coincides with modern liberal democratic thought'and with observed
history in that Congress has in fact overruled some decisions by the
NHTSA. But the perspective is not entirely satisfactory. First, it
seems right that there should be measures of social desirability defin-
able apart from what Congress desires. Certainly political processes.
have in the past produced some disastrous outcomes without losing their
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legitimacy. Second, agency offac! s ..! ;even congressmen are not so
constantly attuned to the will of the people as to not need some other,
more objective, guidance in their decisionmaking.
Welfare economics, while it goes very little of the way towards
resolving the problem of a desirability criterion, does provide the
concepts needed to discuss the problem in precise terms'. The next
section provides such a discussion and re-examines the provisions of the
Safety Act in light of that discussion.
4.2 The Economics of Social Desirability
There are many possible automobile types that automobile manufac-
turers could produce. Each is characterized by a combination of many
attributes: manufacturing cost and selling price, operating cost, style
and comfort, acceleration performance, and, of special interest, the
risks of death and of injuries of different type and severity that it
presents when in use to its driver, other occupants, and persons like
pedestrians and occupants of other vehicles who will be near it. This
risk could be further broken down into risks from side collisions, fron-
tal collisions, etc., or risks of death from fire, from crushing, from
lacerations, etc. The collection of all such combinations of attributes
which could be realized in an automobile is the production space. At any
one time there are many points in the production space represented by
cars that are actually in production, but many that are not. At the
least, all past models should be capable of production and therefore in
76
the production space. Othtr points in t'ie space correspond to modifica-
tions of existing models, for example the addition of more padding or the
redesign of structural members, or to completely new models. In economic
terms, the recurring question facing a regulatory regime that uses ad hoc
decisionmaking is that of the desirability of moving from one set of
points in the production space, that representing current car models, to
another set, that representing the car models which manufacturers would
produce and sell to comply with a new standard.
Welfare economics traces desirability back to the preferences and
wellbeing of individuals and then tries to reach conclusions about social
welfare or social desirability on the basis of those individual prefer-
ences. Using this scheme it becomes necessary to examine what effect a
new safety standard has on individuals. A safety standard changes the
selection of automobiles that car buyers can and will choose from,
usually raising their price. The manufacturers' profits will be reduced
and with them the value of the equity held by their stockholders. The
new car buyers, the occupants of the new cars, occupants of other vehi-
cles, or pedestrians will receive a reduction in the risks of personal
injury or death, depending on the nature of the safety improvement.
It is imperative to maintain an ex ante view of a safety standard as
reducing risks of death and injuries rather than an ex post view of it as
reducing actual deaths and injuries. True, in a nation of 220 million
people and 100 million vehicles, changes in individuals' risks give
nearly predictable changes in actual deaths and injuries. If fact,
observing or predicting changes in actual deaths and injuries may be the
easiest way to calculate the changes in individuals' risks. But no
individual dies or lives because of a motor vehicle safety standard and
its effect on vehicle performance. The modern view of traffic safety is
that accidents are random events whose probability is only conditioned by
vehicle design and performance, driver performance, and environmental
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Their friends and relatives receive a reduction in the risks of
bereavement and loss of support. And a very wide group of persons
receive reductions in the income drain of accident-caused claims on
risk-spreading social insurance systems of all types. There are still
other effects felt by persons with various relations to the buyers and
users of the affected automobiles. Individuals, as a result of changes
in their incomes, risks of death and injury, etc., may regard themselves
as having been made better off or worse off, depending .n the changes for
each and on their own preferences.
Once each individual's change in wellbeing is established, the ques-
tion of social desirability is reduced to a question of how changes in
individuals' wellbeing relate to changes in social wellbeing, i.e., what
sets of changes in individuals' wellbeing are to be considered desir-
able. Welfare economics has only one objectively valid normative state-
ment to make: if every individual considers himself to have not been made
worse off and at least one considers himself better off, the overall
conditions including other drivers and vehicles. Adopting an ex post
view makes a rigorous economic analysis impossible. Welfare economics
depends on changes in individual wellbeing caused by changes in the
allocation of resources and the distribution of goods. If some individ-
uals cease to exist during a change, it becomes absurd to claim to speak
objectively of a change in their individual wellbeing. They certainly
are not available for comment. Injuries are also best treated ex ante,
as this avoids hypothetical questions about what would be necessary to
compensate a person for a seriously disabling injury, like dismemberment
or paralysis. In contrast, it is proper to take an ex post view of the
income reduction felt by persons whose only relation to the killed or
injured is through social insurance systems, since, because of the large
numbers involved, a safety standard gives a nearly certain change in
claims on social insurance systems and these persons remain in existence
before and aftgr the change caused by the standard and feel only the
income effect.
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change should be considered desirable. Tt is the change, not the final
state, that is desirable. Another desirable change may still be pos-
sible. If none is, the final state is defined to be "pareto-optimal" or
"efficient".
This contribution from rigorous welfare economics is weak, but it is
the best that can be offered. By itself this pareto principle of desir-
ability does not even imply that risks of death Ifrom laceration should be
reduced before risks to te same persons of death from fire when the
former is cheaper, since idividuals may distinguish in their preferences
between equal risks of the two ways of dying. It does imply that safety
standards should at least e cost-effective, i.e., that a given amount
and type of risk-reduction should be achieved at minimum penalty in cost,
or convenience, etc.
The weakness of the criterion is that given any nonpareto-optimal.
starting state the desirability criterion applies only to some of the
changes from that state, chose that do not make any person worse off or
do not make any person better off. But changes between pareto-optimal
states, from pareto-optimal states to nonpareto-optimal states, and
between many,pairs of nonpareto-optimal states leave some persons better
off and others worse off. These changes cannot be judged desirable or
undesirable. The pareto principle does suggest that it is undesirable to
choose a nonpareto-optimal final state, since from such a state a desir-
able change is possible.
There is an equivalence theorem of welfare economics which shows that
market systems satisfying three conditions will at least achieve one of
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the pareto-optimal states, though which one of the many that are possible
depends on the initial distribution of productive assets. One obvious
way to augument the pareto principle into a workable desirability crite-
rion would be to set as the goal of safety regulation the state that
would result from a perfect market given the current distribution of
assets. This type of implicit goal is common in the frequent support
from economists for emissions taxes, consumer information programs,
antitrust actions, etc. It is also true that market forces are effec-
tively allowed to define desirability in most areas of conomic activ-
ity. It will not serve as a goal for regulation, however. While it is
easy to show that the target state is not being achievec without regula-
tion, it cannot be reached with regulation, either.
The first point follows from the observation that the market for new
cars, as modified by the accident liability and insurance systems, is
failed, that is, it does not meet the three conditions of the equivalence
theorem mentioned above. The argument that this is so tas given by
several economists in the period surrounding the establishment of the
regulatory regime.6 It will not be repeated here. Briefly, none of
the three conditions is met. The automobile industry is not competitive;
it is a tight oligopoly. Consumers do not have very good information
about what risks are posed by the automobiles they buy. And there are
negative externalities in the consumption of unsafe automobiles that are
not internalized by insurance and liability systems. The failure to
satisfy the three conditions, and the direction of the failure of the
last two, means that the unregulated market produces a nonefficient
80
result characterized by to' it tlc zftcy in the cars being produced and
bought.
The second point follows from the observation that product regulation
of the sort allowed by the Safety Act is too blunt an instrument to
correct a failed market If incomes and preferences of car buyers were
identical, regulation could achieve the production of the same type of
automobile that would be produced under a perfet market. But in the
process, by artificially internalizing externalities, regulation would
create income transfers from new car buyers to other individuals who
would be put at less risk with safer cars but who would not have helped
pay for their higher cost. As a result, regulation cannot achieve the
exact pareto-optimal state that would result from a perfect market.
Regulation is such a blunt and undiscriminating tool that when incomes
and preferences are different among individuals, as they are, there will
always be individuals who place a low value on risk-reductions for them-
selves and would willingly compensate the other persons put at greater
risk if they were allowed to buy less safe but cheaper cars. Regulation
cannot achieve any pareto-optimal state.7
There is-another very common way to augment the pareto principle into
a workable desirability criterion. This is to accept as desirable any
change in which the individuals who are made better off are made so much
better off that together they would be able to compensate the individuals
who are made worse off and still come out ahead on the change. The
hypothetical compensation, which does not actually occur, is through
income transfers. This criterion is the foundation of cost-benefit
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analysis, a decision rule that is widely used in evaluating government
projects of many types, particularly public works projects. The transi-
tion to cost-benefit analysis is made by using preferences as revealed in.
market transactions to find the income transfer -- either the required
compensation or the willingness-to-pay for benefits received -- that it
would take to return each individual to a point of indifference as to the
outcome of the change. The sum of these transfers, each with its appro-
priate sign, is used to judge desirability.
Ex ante cost-benefit analysis of automobile safety ecisions is
subject to two specific criticisms: it neglects distributional or equity
issues and it treats reductions in the risk of death anc; injury as though
they were no different than, say, the-power produced by a hydroelectric
project. The first criticism is true. Cost-benefit analysis could label
as desirable decisions that produce very skewed increments in the distri-
bution of income, unless the skewness of the distribution affects in the
proper way individuals' own attitudes about the desirat. lity of the
decision for themselves. Further, cost-benefit analysis tends to rein-
force the existing uneveness in the distribution of income, since wil-
lingness-to-pay depends on income as well as on preferences. The second
criticism is not true. Cost-benefit analysis assumes that individuals
themselves are willing and able to treat reductions in the risk of death
or injury in the same way they treat the electricity they buy from a
power project. If the assumption is true, it is hard to criticize ex
ante cost-benefit analysis for respecting the preferences of the individ-
uals. There is reason to suspect that serious problems with the assump-
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tion will appear when it comes time to actually do an analysis; but
people do freely buy certain risk-reductions in markets, for example in
the purchase of home fire alarms.8
Congress did not intend to require that the NTSA perform a cost-
benefit analysis and obtain a favorable result before issuing each safety
standard. As mentioned in Section 2.2.1 in the explanation of the
"practicability" requirement, the House Commerce Committee explicitly did
not include an equivalent requirement when it was suggested by the manu-
facturers. Individual congressmen, including subcommittee and committee
chairmen, have repeatedly stated their opposition to attempts by other
Executive Branch agencies to impose a cost-benefit requirement on the
NTHSA's decisions. But the language of the Safety Act is general enough
so as to not preclude a NHTSA Administrator from using a cost-benefit
criterion in his own decisions about the "reasonableness of cost, feasi-
bility, and adequate leadtime." Similarly, a unreasonable risk could be
defined as one that could be corrected with a net gain in the difference
between benefits and costs to all affected persons. The NHTSA is pro-
hibited from issuing a safety standard that does not affect safety, for
example if it believed that lifetime costs could be reduced if manufac-
turers installed higher grade parts that were not related to safety as
original equipment. The NHTSA does not appear to be precluded from
relaxing its own safety constraints on the grounds that the accompanying
cost-reduction made a higher level of risk reasonable (with the probable
exception of the fuel system integrity standard which Congress froze into
law in 1974).
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If an explicit criterion of social desirability is to be defined from
individuals' preferences it must make use of. some way to measure and
compare the strength and define the importance of those preferences.
Cost-benefit analysis is the least contrived way of doing this.
4.3 New and Known Technologies and the Prjcess of
Technological Chtlnge
The previous section rlied on the concept of a production space,
consisting of combinations; of attributes which could be realized in an
automobile, in its interpretation of regulation as a process of choosing
desirable changes in the types of automobiles produced and sold. The
section avoided attempting a more precise definition of the production
space concept. Such a definition must be given, however, because the
concept of the production space is closely related to the distinctions
between known and new technologies and to the concepts of innovation and
technological change. A clear understanding of two types of technolo-
gical change is necessary to understand the interpretation of the objec-
tives of autbmobile safety regulation that will be used in the following
chapters.
There'is a large literature on innovation and technological change in
general, and a sizable one on technological change in the automobile
industry in particular.9 Most of this literature relates to innova-
tion in an unregulated market or in markets characterized by forms of
regulation different than product performance standards. No attempt will
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be made to integrate the distinctions -n here with this literature,
though none of them are inconsistent with those made by others. The
definitions made here will be self consistent and adequate for the
present need.
An automotive "technology" as the term is used here is a method of
manufacturing a combination of target attributes into an automobile, in
the mass quantities normally associated with the modern automobile
industry. Some of these attributes may correspond to the type of perfor-
mance that could be mandated by a safety standard and others may be cost,
style, comfort, etc. In its fullest and final embodiment a technology
consists of the detailed designs for the automobile, the factories and
other capital goods like machine tools-needed for production, the rele-
vant skills of the workforce, and the managerial organization and tech-
niques capable of ensuring that these are combined with appropriate
material inputs to produce the actual automobiles. If these four exist
and are in use mass-producing automobiles for sale, the technology is
.part of the current practice of the art. At a minimum, the production
space contains the combinations of attributes represented by the various
automobile models in production at any one time.
But the production space contains other combinations of attributes as
well1., in the sense that it would be possible to mass-produce automobiles
other than those now being produced, with other combinations of attri-
butes. 'Definitional subtleties arise in putting a precise meaning on the
-word "possible". The definition that will be used here is that a combi-
mation of attributes is contained in the production space if there is a
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known-technology for achieving those attributes in an automobile. A
technology can be known even if the vehicle designs, capital equipment,
workforce skills, and managerial organization needed to actually begin
-production do not exist. It is only necessary that it be known with some
:certainty how to bring each of.them into existence from scratch or
through modifications to existing vehicle designs, machine tools,
assembly lines, etc. The creation or modification of vehicle designs,
the design or selection, acquisition, and arrangement cJ capital equip-
-ment, the training of workers in new skills, and the structuring of
-managerial control lines will be called technology embcdiment - an
-awkward phrase but one that will avoid any confusion. The automobile
-manufacturers and their suppliers have a technology of technology embodi-
:ment that is often nearly as methodical in its own way as the assembly of
-a single car. They use t regularly when engineering new models and
-model -changes. The collection of known technologies which it would be
-possible to embody and thus put into practice is the st.ate of the art.
At any one time market forces and regulation combine to cause only a
'limited subset of the known technologies to be embodied as part of the
.iuret -practice of the art.
.Thoe ability to embody a suitable technology separates those combina-
-tions of automobile attributes that are achievable with known technology
from those that cannot be acheived without the prior development or
generation of new technology. The distinction between technology embodi-
-ment and technology generation is a crucial one. The essence of the
.distinction is in what is required to complete the process. Technology
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embodiment requires engineering to arri. at final designs for the auto-
mobile itself and for the manufacturing process that will produce it.
Technology generation or development requires discovery, invention,
innovation, breakthroughs or new concepts to succeed; it may be complete
long before there are any final designs in existence. Technology embodi-
ment is characterized by relative certainty of success, technology gener-
ation by relative uncertainty. In the American automobile industry,
technology embodiment generally goes on at the division level within a
manufacturing corporation; generation of new technologies more often
occurs in corporate level research centers.
Some examples should elp to clarify the distinction. The develop-
ment by General Motors of the side door beam concept was an example of
technology generation. Once it was done, the designing and tooling for
door beams for Fords, Toyotas, and Volkswagens were examples of techno-
logy embodiment. The revision of MVSS 105, on hydraulic brake systems,
required a good deal of egineering effort on the part of the manufac-
turers, but it was the sort of effort that routinely goes into matching a
braking system to new model. What was different were the criteria used
in selecting the braking systems and the number of models which had to be
re-engineered in a short period.l0 Though manufacturers had apparently
never designed cars with fuel system integrity as a strict constraint
before revision of MVSS 301 was issued, they knew that at the impact
speeds specified in the revision their existing models would retain their
basic structural integrity. The manufacturers could then expect that
compliance would perhaps require selective reinforcement or relocation of
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the fuel tank, rerouting of connecting tines away from areas where they
would be severed in a collision, and the addition of check valves. They
knew how to go about finding the required modifications using a "cut-and-
crash-test" approach. Similarly, there was no doubt that locking
steering columns were possible on any car, although some engineering
effort was required to design new columns, integrate them into the
surrounding vehicle, and change the production procesi to accomodate
.these changes in the product. Each of these changes were examples of
technology embodiment. None deserves to be ranked with new automotive
technologies, as electronic ignition, high strength steels, automatic
transmissions, and the first energy absorbing steering column once were
and as ceramic gas turbine parts and miss produced Stirling engines may
be in the future.
Technology embodiment does not preclude having to rely on experimen-
tation to resolve uncertainties. Very few designs that must give a
certain crash performance can be made final without experimental deter-
mination of their actual crash performance. The state of the art of
structural design still relies on such experiments. But there is funda-
mental differdnce between repeatedly crash testing prototypes in order to
find how thick a certain steel member must be made and repeatedly testing
variations of a new composite material to find whether any will give the-
combination of cost, strength, and fracture properties that would allow
it to replace the steel member. Eventually success is assured in the
first case though the final thickness is uncertain; success is in doubt
in the second case.
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.This distinction between technology embodiment and generation is not
entirely satisfactory for several reasons. First, uncertainty exists in
both even though 'technology embodiment is distinguished by being less
uncertain. Uncertainty is greatest in the effect that achieving a set of
attributes will have on other unconstrained attributes. Until the re-
quired modifications to fuel systems were found and incorporated into
designs manufacturers probably had only guesses as to what they would
cost. Uncertainty about the full effects o meeting a ew set of re-
quirements will be greater the greater the departure of those require-
ments from the current practice of the art. Second, it is difficult to
observe technology embodiment in progress without observing new
technology being generated at the same-time. As engineers design door
beams for one model they discover new ways of reducing cost and weight
that can be applied to that model and to other models. Thus, the tech-
nology that eventually is used to achieve compliance with the require-
ments of a standard may not be the known technology whc.e embodiment
would have been the only or best way to achieve compliance at first.
This is particularly true for incremental innovative improvements to
known technologies or design approaches that cummulatively result in new
technologies. Third, what each manufacturer is capable of embodying
depends on his own skill and knowledge; there may be different production
spaces for each manufacturer. Finally, it is very difficult for an
outsider to spot new concepts as they appear and distinguish then from
old concepts that had just been unused previously. It may be difficult
to unambiguously label a given technology as either new or previously
known.
89
4.4' The Two Objectives of Autcomobile Safety Regulation
There are then two types of technological change. One is movement
between existing points in the production space, the reducing to practice'
of technologies that are already part of the state of the art. The
second is the generation of new points in the production space, making
possible combinations of attributes that were previously not attainable.
The new technologies generated in the second type of change may provide
greater safety than was possible before or equal safety at lower cost or
may affect only non-safety attributes. New technologie:s may also be
generated which are inferior to known technologies. A new technology
may or may not be embodied after it is generated. Whether it is deter-
mines the immediate impact of its generation of the attributes of auto-
mobiles as produced and sold. Embodiment may be prompted by either
market forces or by regulation once a new technology becomes known.
Whether compliance with a new safety standard is feasible corresponds
with whether a suitable known technology can be embodiei by its effective
date or whether a new technology can be generated and then embodied.
Feasibility is certain only when just embodiment is necessary. Since
feasibility i one precondition to practicability, a similar statement
could be made about certain practicability.
One objective of automobile safety regulation has already been iden-
tified. It can be restated as the forced incorporation into new cars of
safety attributes that can be achieved by known technologies whose over-
all effect on all attributes is considered desirable. This objective
essentially seeks to take advantage of existing opportunities. A second
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objective of regulation -- or rather of t- Safety Act which also created
the regulatory regime - is to create new opportunities by generating new
technologies which might provide still more desirable combinations of
attributes. The legislative history of the Safety Act makes it clear
that this goal was one of the reasons for providing for research and
development by the NHTSA.
Meeting the first objective is done through regulation with safety
standards. Chapter 5 dis:-isses how the NHTSA has gone about achieving
this first objective and :lie problems it has encountered. Chapter 6 does
the same for the second objective, generating new technology. The
primary method for doing ::iis has been through research and development
paid for or conducted by the government.
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CHAPTER TVE
FIRST OBJECTIVE: PUTTING KNOWN TECHNOLOGIES INTO PRACTICE
If the view of the NHTSA as having two objectives, to put desirable
technologies into use and to generate new technologies which might also
be desirable, is accepted then standards development is the process of
accomplishing the first objective.
The NHTSA does not officially accept the view that its first objec-
tive should be to take advantage of opportunities for desirable changes
as presented by known but unused technologies. It was mentioned in
Chapter 4 that the NHTSA tends to see its official mission as consisting
of a single objective: the reduction of traffic fatalities and injuries.
It professes to use a range of programs, authorized by the various acts
which it administers, to affect the "bottom line" of national traffic
accident statistics. Motor vehicle safety standards are just one of the
possible "countermeasures" that the agency may adopt; others are defect
and recall proceedings, public education programs, and highway safety
standards tied to federal grants to the states. The functional organiza-
tion of the NHTSA's programs into a Motor Vehicle Programs Office and a
Traffic Safety Programs Office tends to decouple joint consideration of
some of these distinct types of countermeasures in practice. But the
NHTSA's own working orders emphasize coordination between the programs
via agency-level multiyear plans.l
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However, as it goes ahnit pursuing its single objective, the NHTSA
in effect does tend to use motor vehicle safety standards in an oppor-
tunistic manner. In sometimes arrives at a candidate safety standard by
simply pursuing reductions in traffic fatalities and injuries rather than
examining technologies that might be desirable, but once the standard is
proposed it usually does attempt to judge its desirability in terms of
more that just its accident-reduction potential.
The three sections in this chapter analyze how standards development
as the NHTSA views it is supposed.to proceed, the inherent problems in
developing standards and how the NHTSA tries to resolve them, and the
consequences of the unresolved or unresolvable problems for the process
and outcome of regulation.
5.1 The NHTSA Approach to Standards Development
Before describing the NHTSA's approach to developing motor vehicle
safety standards for automobiles, it is worthwhile to briefly review .two
of the restrictions on the content of safety standards. A safety stan-
dard can only'set objective requirements, and only on the performance of
a motor vehicle. A test of performance is objective if it is repeat-
able. Different persons conducting a performance test as described in. 
standard on the same vehicle must obtain the same results as to the
compliance or noncompliance of the vehicle. Tests called for in stan-
Section 2.2.1 contains the complete discussion of these restrictions.
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dards thus must specify closely controlled test conditions so as to
eliminate variations due to the test procedure and to isolated variations
due to the tested vehicle itself. The exact nature of the restriction
imposed on a standard by virtue of it being allowed to regulate only
performance is not as clear. Standards presently exist whith require the
installation of particular types of equipment. Some specify distances
-and areas. The headlamp section of MVSS 108 sets dimensions and toler-
-ances, but that should be considered exceptional.
-There are four conceptual steps that can be generalized from the
.NHTSA's past efforts at standards development.2 The first step results
in candidate objective performance tests and requirements for inclusion
into a new standard or amendment. There are two approaches to
accomplishing this first step. The first approach is through the identi-
-fication of safety problems. While the overall problem from the agency's
view is traffic deaths and injuries, it tries to identify more homoge-
-neous -categories within this overall problem which migt. be susceptible
:to common solution, e.g., postcrash fires or accidents caused by under-
inflated tires or injuries sustained by pregnant women wearing conven-
tional:seat blts. Problem areas come to the agency's attention through
-accident investigation, statistical analysis of accident reports, compli-
-ance testing, consumer complaints, and ruiemaking petitions. The agency
-assigns priorities to problem areas as needed to keep its workload
.comnensurate with its resources.
Once a problem has been identified the NHTSA determines what level
-and type of vehicle performance as defined by carefully controlled,
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objective testing will be adequate to correct the actual problem on the
highway. For example, once the NHTSA identified a safety problem caused
by windshield intrusions, it had to devise a performance test suitable
:for inclusion in a safety standard that would correct the intrusion
-problem. In this particular case, the NHTSA had to determine what
portion of the windshield area should not be penetrated and how much room
was required in front of the windshield to allow for outpocketing when an
occupant fractured the wir.ishield from inside. The transistion had to be
made from inadequate vehicle performance on actual highways in complex,
car-to-car collisions to r.:quirements on vehicle performance in carefully
controlled crash testing .aito flat barriers.
The second approach to completing. the first step in developing a
:standard is to consider actual changes in vehicle design. Promising
.changes may be sought in response to specific safety problems, for
.example low tire pressure warning devices might be investigated and
considered as a correction to the problem of accidents caused by low tire
.pressure. Or changes may be considered without any specific problem
:having been identified first. Ideas for changes in design may be col-
lected by the, NHTSA's own engineers and by research contractors specifi-
=catly given that task. Other persons or automotive companies may also
suggest promising changes. Obvious differences in the design of current
:models may also be a source.
lnce a change is identified it is necessary to devise performance
requirements that will have the effect of forcing the contemplated
changes in design to be made. In this approach it is not necessarily the
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fact' that a vehicle is capable of achieving certain performance in a
controlled test that assures correction of a safety problem. It may be
that in order to provide that performance manufacturers must change their
designs in ways that will have the effect of correcting the safety
-problem. For example, the performance test for side door strength had
little to do the mechanics of actual side collisions, but it has the
effect of forcing the use of side door beams which may improve crash-
worthiness in actual side collisions. Another extreme example is the
test procedure for signal lamp light output. Only a few test points are
chosen for measuring light intensity for each lamp; the test is more one
of the design of the lamp bulb and lens material that of the actual
lighting performance of the entire lamp. Using this second approach
allows the NHTSA to consider promising safety 'technologies directly,
without explicitly working backwards from an identified safety problem to
the vehicle performance that would be required to correct the problem.
Some examples of the first step using the two different approaches
-will illustrate the difference. As just pointed out, the standard for
windshield zone intrusion was motivated by observations of accidents in
-which dislocation of the engine hood through the windshield caused
injuries that would not have occurred otherwise. The revision to the
-fuel system integrity standard was similar. Accident investigation
confirmed the suspicion that rear-end collisions were as important as
'front-end collisions in causing fuel spillage. The headlamp concealment
devices and accelerator control systems standards are two more examples
in which specific performance failures were considered to be accident
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hazards. In contrast, the ropoed ch.ns to a three-beam headlighting
system was the result of a general investigation of ways headlighting
could be improved, motivated by the belief that better illumination might
reduce accidents. The same sort of motivation was true for rear sig-
naling systems; the first research contracts in that area evaluated the
advantages of alternative systems rather than identified specific
failings of the present systems that were contributing to accidents.
There was once an ANPRM issued which contemplated standardizing horn
signal intensity and pitch, with unique identifying pitches for different
classes of vehicles. The lack of such standarization could never be
observed to be a contributor to accidents, although it is conceivable
that a well-designed field test might show a safety advantage for stan-
dardization. Numerous other examples of proposals and research projects
that seemed to have skipped the problem identification step could be
given. Part of the reason that there have been so many is that many
problem areas were identified or hypothesized long before the NHTSA began
its work and over the years ideas for correcting these problems
accumulated.
The first step in standards development may result in more than one
candidate for consideration, including perhaps alternatives that do not
include vehicle modifications but rely on highway safety programs
instead. The second step is to determine the effects of adopting each
alternative or combination of alternatives. Possible remedies to
problems and possible improvements not originated as remedies to specific
problems are evaluated for their contribution to the goal of reducing
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accidents, deaths, and injuries and for their effects on cost, non-safety
aspects of vehicle performance, or other considerations. Even if the
NHTSA were interested primarily in possible increases in safety, it must
identify and consider the reasonableness of other consequences of
adopting a remedy or improvement lest it be found to have acted arbitrar-
ily in ignoring them. The third step in standards development is to
choose the desirable candidate or candidates on the basis of the infor-
mation produced in the second step. The fourth step is to go through the
rulemaking procedures necessary to promulgate the new standards or amend-
ments. A fifth step, in-use evaluation, is added sometimes to provide a
check on the accuracy of the other four by measuring the effectiveness of
the adopted standard once implemented.-
5.2 Inherent Problems and Attempts to Resolve Them
It is possible for faulty execution and simple mistakes to cause the
idealized process of standards development to go awry, and this has
without doubt occurred many times. But there are more serious compli-
cations in the process which create difficulties in practice for which
even faultless execution cannot compensate. Some of these difficulties
have been more serious in the past ten years than they would have had to
be, but their presence is unavoidable.
Objective Performance Requirements
When the NHTSA succeeds in identifying a safety problem.through its
accident investigation research it may run into difficulties devising
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appropriate objective performance requirements for inclusion in a new or
revised standard. In some cases the need is for a performance measure, a
way of quantifying some aspect of vehicle performance. Examples of some
existing performance measures are the head injury criterion, which is an
integral function of the acceleration loads on an occupant's head during
a collision, braking distance from a given starting speed, the angle of
view provided by a rearview mirror, the strength of a.seat when loaded in
a certain way, the boiling point of a brake fluid, and the speed of flame
spread on a fabric. In designing most performance measures it is neces-
sary to very carefully control test conditions, for example in defining
the angle of view provided by a mirror, the position of the driver's eyes
relative to the mirror is critical to a repeatable test. In crash tests
the loading of a vehicle may be important. The NHTSA relies on the
performance tests of the SAE and other standards groups for many of its
performance measures. It has also hired contractors to devise new per-
formance measures, and its own engineers have done the same. A perfor-
mance measure may be quite simple, for example the time required for an
accelerator control device to return to idle when disconnected, or
complex, for xample a single figure of merit for evaluating the entire
direct field of view provided by an automobile.
Once a suitable performance measure is available, it is necessary to
choose the level of performance necessary to correct the identified
safety problem. This requires accident investigation, biomechanics
research on injury mechanisms, measurements of driver capabilities and
vehicle mechanics, etc. The NHTSA relies on its own research and
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research done by others. The presently proposed maximum allowable head
injury criterion, for example, is the result of research by many groups.
The same is true for the femur load limit. In many cases there is no
threshhold level of performance that will completely correct the safety
problem at hand; instead, higher levels of performance would achieve
successively greater reductions in fatalities and injuries. The speed of
a barrier test crash is an obvious example. On occasion the NHTSA has
tried to find the "required" level of performance in areis like these.
For example, one contractor was asked to find the direct, field of view
required for safe driving. This insistence on finding the perfor-
mance levels required for safety is consistent with the HTSA's view of
its task as the correction of safety problems; it is inconsistent with
the view that regulation is supposed to make only desirable changes,
which may still allow for fatalities and injures of each particular
type. In such cases, all levels should ideally be considered so as to
choose the most desirable one. Obviously, the 30 mph crash tests
required in the present standards do not necessarily solve all safety
problems of the types addressed by each standard. They are instead some
sort of compromise between what would be needed to prevent all fatalities
and injuries and what can be achieved at various costs by present tech-
nologies.
Problems may arise in finding suitable objective performance
measures in complex areas of vehicle behavior. It is an inescapable
limitation of regulation dependent on objective performance standards
that regulators cannot control product design decisions as completely as
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can'design engineers within each firm or as completely as they would be
able to if the industry were a public enterprise and they were in control
of product design. The restriction to objective performance standards
limits the types of product changes that can be accomplished and raises
the complexity of accomplishing those that still can be. The NHTSA's
work in.handling and stability is an example. The traditional practice
in the automobile industry is to adjust the design of the handling-
related parts of a vehicle until the desired performance, as judged by
subjective testing, is attained. It is accepted that virtually any
handling performance that might be desired can be engineered into a
vehicle in this way. The NHTSA has said that it has identified by sub-
jective testing and by comparison of statistics on roll-over accidents
4
car models with dangerous handling characteristics. If the agency
could simply impose its subjective judgments in place of those of the
manufacturers of these vehicles it could solve the problem readily.
Instead it has been working on developing objective per ormance tests for
handling and stability at least since 1970 and has plans for several more
years of work. The task is complicated by the number of .test conditions
that must be ontrolled, the difficulty in controlling them in realistic
ways, and the number of separate but interacting performance modes that
must be considered. The agency has succeeded in developing a few of the
many performance tests it has been seeking and may eventually succeed
with others in this area. But the cost in time and research effort has
been high and the agency will likely never have a set of objective tests
that will capture all the aspects of handling that are easily judged with
subjective testing.
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Feasibility
If the NHTSA has developed a set of requirements on the basis of the
performance necessary to correct a problem, it must verify that the
requirements are feasible within the state of the art. If they are not,
a standard including them will not be practicable. It may also be the
case that there is a technology which would give the required perfor-
mance but that it is not desirable when all of its impacts are consid-
ered. The same may happen with design changes that are proposed as at
least partial corrections :o a problem or as simply promising ways of
increasing safety generall'r. This is evidently the case with pedestrian
protection. The simple elimination of stylistic, protrusions and hood
ornaments might prevent some pedestrian injuries, but the NHTSA has
apparently concluded that such a change would not be desirable on the
whole. Technologies that would give protection to a wider group of
pedestrians are either unknown or involve undesirable changes in other
vehicle attributes.
If no desirable technology exists for regulation to force into use,
standards development cannot proceed. Effort should then be directed
towards advancing the state of the art in hope of discovering a suitable
technology. This has in fact happened with pedestrian protection.
Although rulemaking by the NHTSA in the area is still officially active,:
there has been no announced timetable for its completion that has been
anything more than wishful thinking. The research that is designated as
supporting the rulemaking is in fact still exploratory.
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If standards development is viewed only as a process for getting
desirable known technologies into use, then t is disappointing but not
embarassing to find that no suitable technology exists in a given area of
traffic safety. Cases like pedestrian protection appear to be failures
only because of the NHTSA's view of its mission as being the reduction of
traffic losses per se.
Predicting Impacts
The second step in de-ieloping a safety standard, determining the
effects of adopting each alternative under consideration, implies the
collection of large amoun:s of information, especially when there are
several competing alterna:ives or if the most desirable level of required
performance must be found. Even when only one alternative and the status
quo are under consideration, the amount of information required to
predict impacts is large. It is not surprising that problems arise in
assembling this information.
The information needed is of two types. First, the desirable conse-
quences of issuing a new standard should be known. These are primarily
the reductions in the risks to individuals of accidental death and
injuries and the reductions in income losses to a wide group of individ-
uals when reductions in actual deaths and injuries and the claims they
make on risk-spreading social insurance systems are achieved. The NHTSA
does not attempt to predict impacts on individuals. Instead, it tries to
predict the reduction in accidental deaths and injuries at the national
level and calculates related income losses from this number using figures
for average income loss per death or injury. Second, the undesirable
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consequences should be known. Thesc Ccnriet primarily of increased costs
in manufacturing and operating automobiles.
There are two ways of obtaining the first type of information for a
proposed standard. The NHTSA has used both on various occasions. One is
to classify and count accident situtations by type and to measure or
predict the effectiveness of the standard's requirements in avoiding
accidents of each type or in reducing injuries sustained in each type.
Arithmetic then yields the national reduction in injuries and fatali-
ties. This approach suggests itself naturally for vehicle modifications
which are proposed to correct identified safety problems, since the
relevant types of accidents will have already been defined and possibly
counted. The NHTSA has formally used this approach to evaluate the
5
consequences of the passive restraint standard, the indirect visibil-
ity standard, and the recent speedometer and odometer calibration and
labeling proposal.7 A second way to predict the impact of issuing a
standard is to field test modified vehicles and statistically compare
their overall accident and injury records with a control group of unmodi-
fied vehicles. This also was and is being done by the NHTSA for rear
signaling systems8 and has been proposed for polarized headlamp
systems.9 A closely related approach is to take advantage of natural
variations in the existing automobile fleet by statistically comparing
accident records of models with different designs and performance. The
NITSA has attempted this for direct visibility, an area where significant
differences in field of view are found among different car models.1 0
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This might also have been possible for side door beams during the years
when only a relatively few General Motors cars had them.
Both approaches have problems. For the last ten years it has been
impossible to accurately count the occurances of particular types of
accident situations on a national level. This has been because the
states'.investigation and reporting systems are incomplete, not compre-
hensive, and inconsistent in their recording and classification of
accidents. The NHTSA's own accident investigation efforts have been more
clinical than epidemiological; they have been very gooc for defining
accident types but the data bases they have produced h,re not been
statistically represenrative of the national scene. Tehy have hence been
unable to reliably count the incidence of each type of accident. The
NHTSA is in the process of designing and implementing an improved
-accident reporting and analysis system, including a National Accident
Sampling Systems that will help to correct this deficiency. It has also
often been impossible to measure the effectiveness of .:andidate
-modifications in particular accident types, relative to each other or to
-present vehicles. It is fairly easy for crashworthiness'modifications
since once an accident occurs injury production or mitigation i's a
-relatively deterministic problem in mechanics. But even in
.crashworthiness the variety of accident types causes problems, since
-small differences in road and vehicle design, collision speed, and
vehicle and occupant orientation at the time of collision can affect
injury production, thus multiplying the types of accidents that should
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be considered separately. Also, although injury production is a
deterministic problem in mechanics, it is a very complicated one. The
impossibility of controlled laboratory testing of effectiveness with
human subjects means that reliance must be placed on anthropomorphic
dummies, cadavers, animals, computer simulations, and the poorly
monitored natural experiments offered by actual accidents. The NHTSA
tried unsuccessfully for several years to get funding for a project to
install crash recorders in a fleet on 100,000 automobiles, largely in
order to get better estimates of how vehicle behavior a measurable in
carefully controlled crash testing correlated with injucy production in
actual on-the-road accidents.
In accident avoidance it is almost impossible to measure effec-
tiveness objectively without resort to statistical analysis of field
tests. Accident avoidance features on a vehicle always interact with
driver performance. The combination cannot be considered deterministic,
and despite attempts it has not been successfully modeled.l 2 The only
conceptual drawback to field tests, whether of an accicint avoidance or
of a crashworthiness feature, is that people's transient reaction to a
change may produce results that are unrepresentative of what would occur
at equilibrium with an entire fleet equipped with the feature. Of
course, a field test must be carefully designed to account for possible
interaction effects between modified and unmodified vehicles and to
ensure the statistical representativeness of the test samples. But field
testing takes time and resources to accomplish; since the normal accident
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rate is very low, extensive and expensive testing is needed to get sta-
tistically significant differences between control and test groups. A
multi-year field test of 12,000 automobiles with air bags has been pos-
sible only because General Motors lost money when it sold 10,000 of them
to customers who were willing to pay $315 for the option. Had the NHTSA
conducted such a field test as part of its research program it would have
cost it more than $3,150,000, which is itself close to the agency's an-
nual research budget for crash survivability. Even thate: field test has
been insufficient to objectively demonstrate the effectiveness of air
13bags to everyone's satisfaction. Other field tests tat the NHTSA
has conducted have involved many fewer vehicles, on the order of dozens
or hundreds. They have also used fleets of vehicles with questionable
representativeness. The use of a taxi fleet, for example, makes repor-
ting and record keeping much easier but questions arise with it as to the
validity of extrapolating the results to privately owned automobiles.
The second' type of information, that on the increaes in cost neces-
sary to produce compliance with a proposed standard, it. in principle more
amenable to acquisition. The automobile manufacturers have had to
develop the capability for such cost estimation for their own planning
purposes, though at least a preliminary design must be developed and
verified before estimation is possible. The NHTSA must then either
duplicate their capability and sources of input information in-house or
get the cost estimates directly from the manufacturers. It has tried to
do both in the past, with mixed success. l4 Both cost information and
cost-estimation techniques are carefully guarded information. Since 1974
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the NHTSA may legally compel cost disclosures from a manufacturer, but
only if he objects to an officially proposed standard on the grounds of
excessive cost. Thus, the NHTSA would have to wait until it issued an
NPRM before it would have the opportunity of forcing disclosure. The
NHTSA has never actually used its disclosure authority. Manufacturers
often volunteer some cost information, though not always in useful form.
However, estimates of the initial cost of compliance usually have not
been as major a point of unresolved disagreement as have safety impact
estimates. The NHTSA recently was able to identify assumptions that it
found questionable in some manufacturers' procedures for estimating the
cost of air bag installation and was thus able to refut2 estimates that
were substantially at variance with its own.15 Estimating compliance
costs for the long run, after cost-saving innovations may occur, is much
more difficult for even the manufacturers.
The NHTSA has coped with the lack of objective information in
several ways. One common response has been to simply v-thhold decision
on proposals until more information is acquired. There have been
occasions in which subjective estimates of the effectiveness of proposed
standards have been explicitly substituted for missing data in formal
analyses. One example in indirect visibility occurred in January
1971,16 in what was still a fairly activist period in the agency's
history. Another in speedometer labeling occurred in late 1976.17
These subjective estimates may represent the expert judgment of agency
engineers and statisticians who have with experience acquired a special
ability to make them accurately. But to the non-expert they can appear
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arbitrary. For example, in the speedometer labeling case the estimate
was that 5 of fatal, high-speed.accidents involving young drivers could
be prevented by restricting the maximum indicated speed on the
speedometer to 85 mph, without changing the top speed of the car.
Neither of the occasions mentioned have been followed by a new safety
standard, so no check on the accuracy of the subjective estimates has
been possible. The NHTSA has tried to use surrogate measures of
effectiveness in some instances when actual measures were not available.
This has been common in visibility and lighting areas, where comparative
data on driver perception nd reaction times and eye scanning patterns
have been used to judge tht superiority of one system over another.
Surrogate measures like these can at best show that one system is better
than another; in the case of rear signaling systems not even this has
been possible. Surrogate measures cannot give quantitative estimates of
fatality and injury reductions. By far the most common way of making do
in the face of uncertainty has been to use subjective estimates of
effectiveness implicitly in decisionmaking, without recourse to any
formal quantification of safety benefits or compliance costs.
Deci sionmaking
Eventually the NHTSA must decide whether or not to adopt a candidate
standard once ithas developed its performance requirements and predicted
its cost and safety impact as well as it is able or chooses to do. The
alternative, to postpone decisions indefinitely, is also possible, of
course. As explained earlier, the Safety Act does not specify how the
NHTSA should go about making its decisions. The Act placed few restric-
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tions on how decisions are to made once it is established that a proposed
standard will increase safety and that compliance with it is feasible.
Thus, one of the problems inherent in standards development is that of
choosing how to make decisions. The NHTSA has not coped well with this
problem. It has not established any desirability criterion that could
provide it with a way of making individual decisions objectively consis-
tent. Instead of deciding how decisions will be made,.it makes decisions.
The discussion of desirability criteria in Chapter 4 suggested that
cost-benefit analysis was a commonly used method of decisionmaking for
government projects, and that ex ante cost-benefit analysis can in
principle provide a workable desirability criterion for judging the type
of changes that would result from the adoption of a candidate safety
standard. The reason that discussion was as detailed as it was is that a
type of cost-benefit analysis is as close as the NHTSA has come to a
consistent desirability criterion.
The NHTSA does not claim to have adopted a cost-benefit criterion as
the test of desirability of particular standards. To do so would be
inconsistent with its own view of its mission. Instead, the NHTSA claims
to use cost-benefit analysis to establish priorities among safety
problems to be addressed in standards development. -But the NHTSA
performs cost-benefit analyses when the iformation required to do so for
individual proposals is available, and it seeks the missing information
that would make them possible when it is not immediately available.
In its early years the NHTSA tended to explain its decisions in the
language of the Safety Act: the need for safety, practicable require-
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ments, etc. During that period, subjective decisions were made on each
proposal, usually without a formal analysis of its impacts. The first
-decision by the NHTSA to be explained in cost-benefit terms related to a
proposed standard for rear underride,guards on heavy trucks. In June
1971 the NHTSA withdrew the proposal, which had been outstanding for two
years, and explained that it had determined that the costs of the stan-
dard would exceed its benefits if promulgated. Since then the agency has
explained several more of its rulemaking decisions in trms of the
balance of costs and benefits, though always without pu5lishing the
analyses or their numerical results. 8 The Secretaries of Transpor-
tation have published formal cost-benefit analyses with recent passive
restraint decisions. 1 9 The NHTSA has attempted analyses 2 0 for other
rulemaking areas, both at its own initiative and after pressured urgings
from other Executive Branch agencies.21 In 1976 the Secretary of
Transportation directed all of his Department to in effect use cost-
benefit analysis to review proposed regulations in order to ensure that
.they were "sound" 22
The NHTSA has never defended a rulemaking decision solely on the
basis of a published cost-benefit analysis in the way a public works
.project might be, however. One reason is that the NHTSA can rarely
defend its estimates of the safety and cost impacts as being accurate.
Another is that for the NHTSA to say that the lives that would be saved
with a standard are not worth the cost of saving them, which is what
decisionmaking using its particular type of cost-benefit analysis would
imply, would contradict the NHTSA's own view of its mission as the reduc-
tion of traffic fatalities and injuries.
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-Even the NHTSA's limite use of cost-benefit analysis has been very
unpopular with Congressional oversight committees and with safety advo-
cates.23 Opposition to the NHTSA's use of cost-benefit analysis by
these groups appears to stem partly from disagreement with its neglect of
equity considerations, partly from abhorence of the seeming feelingless
use of precise calculations to balance one man's life against a corpora-
tion's profits, and partly from dissatisfaction with the outcome of
particular decisions that have been made on the basis o, defended with,
or withheld because of the inability to perform a cost-':enefit analysis.
The NHTSA's cost-benefit analyses are not the ex arte type discussed
in Chapter 4. Instead, the agency uses an ex post anal)sis. The NHTSA
has made an estimate of the loss in national consumption and investment
due to the annual traffic fatalities and injuries and calculates from
that estimate the average loss per injury of each severity level and per
fatality.24 The estimate includes both consumption losses which could
be captured in GNP and others, like loss to community :tivities of the
voluntary contributions of time by injured and killed community members,
that would not be captured in GNP since no markets for their exchange
exist. Pain,' suffering, and bereavement are not included. Expenditures
like those for remedial medical care are not -treated as consumption. The
benefit of a proposed standard is taken to be the expected reductions in
deaths and injuries multiplied by the estimated average loss for each.
This benefit is then compared to the estimated compliance cost of the
standard.
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'This sort of ex post analysis appears at first to be very different
than the rigorous ex ante analysis discussed in Chapter 4. The NHTSA's
approach does make it seem that the survivors of traffic accidents are
-reluctant to forego any of their own consumption to save the lives of the
victims. The only concession made to the dead is that the personal
consumption they would have enjoyed had they survived is recognized as no
longer enjoyed by anyone. Actually, the results of one of the NHTSA's
analyses would be identica. to the results that would be arrived at if ex
ante analysis were possibl , but for some important flaws. First, the
'NRSA's analyses in effect: assume that individuals are indifferent to
changes in the risks of future pain, suffering, and bereavement. This
failing is recognized by the NHTSA. The agency was understandably unable
to quantify in dollar terms the losses produced by actual pain, suffer-
ing, and bereavement and so it was forced to leave those out of its
totals; it might have been more successful if it had tried to find.
-individuals' values for reductions in the risks instead. Second, the
NHTSA uses average losses where it would be proper to use marginal
losses. Marginal losses should be less than average losses because of
fixed overheads in insurance administrat;on,,police services, etc.
Finally, in order to equate the results of the ex post and ex ante
,analyses, it must be assumed that all persons are risk-neutral, i.e. that
.they value changes in risk at the change in their expected consumption.
This assumption seems unfounded and because the NHTSA does not recognize
having made it, i.t is undefended. Individuals have generally been found
to be risk-averse to changes in income. Their risk preferences for
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lotteries involving the possibil'ty of diff-rent types of death has so
25
far been mostly a matter of conjecture only. The first of these
faults suggests that the NHTSA's analyses place too low a value on reduc-
tions in deaths and injuries, especially injuries. The second works in
the opposite direction. The effect of the third must be considered
unknown but conceivably quite large.
Even with these flaws, the NHTSA's use of cost-benefit analysis can
help to ensure that standards that would require a high expenditure per
unit reduction in risk are not adopted before other standards that have a
lower required expenditure and are hence more cost-effective. Any
decision to reject a standard with an unfavorable benefit-to-cost ratio
can always be explained in terms of cost-effectiveness rather than in
terms of a value of human life.
It must be remembered that in many cases the lack of complete infor-
nation, which problems in prediction make inevitable, prevents any sort
of objective cost-benefit analysis from being performed. In some of the
instances in which the NHTSA has explained its decisions in terms of the
balance of cost and benefits without publishing figures for either, it is
fair to presuie the agency either used entirely subjective estimates of
effectiveness in a formal analysis or simply chose to explain its subjec-
tive decisions in the language of costs and benefits.
Conflicts Between Interests and Ideologies
A final problem in standards development is that once a decision to
adopt a standard is made it may be necessary to defend that decision
against political opposition. The unanimous vote in favor of the Safety
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Act 'in 1966 did not end all opposition to the concept of federal regu-
lation of automobile safety. Replacing market decisions on the alloca-
tion of resources with centrally planned allocations always creates
losers, both real and perceived. When the NHTSA issues a safety standard
it restricts the perceived freedom of choice of car buyers. As the
congressional revocation of the ignition interlock presumably showed, car
buyers may not agree with the decisions that have replaced their own and
may be able to overrule regulations. The public respon.se to the NPRM on
speed limitation indicated that a similar event might hve occurred if
that proposal had been adopted. There are also individuals who are
ideologically opposed to automobile safety and other regulatory
programs. These individuals are natural allies of individuals who are
actually made worse off because of particular standards. There may also
be individuals who agree in principle with regulation but who hold esti-
mates of the impacts of a standard that are different than the NHTSA's.
These people may also oppose individual standards.
'More importantly, regulation will in almost all cases cause.a reduc-
tion in the profits of the automobile manufacturers, for if a profitable
change in design or pricing were possible the manufacturers would likely
'have already taken advantage of it. Most standards cause higher produc-
tion costs and lover sales and profits. The only exception would be if
the existence of a standard allowed the domestic manufacturers to operate
even more like a cartel than they would be able otherwise. This seems
unlikely and there is no evidence to support it. When the NHSTA regu-
'lates, the manufacturers lose. If they perceive a threatened loss as
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serious enough they may take advantage of whatever political influence
they have in Congress or the Executive Branch.
The Administrator of the NHTSA and the Secretary of Transportation
are both political appointees who must be responsive to and will normally
be sympathetic with the Executive Office. The NHTSA also depends on the
Secretary of Transportation, the Office of Management and Budget, and
Congress for approval of its operating budget. This means that there are
channels through which pol:.tical pressure may be put on the agency to
make decisions it would nc.': otherwise. Outright congressional reversals
of agency actions are only one way that interests which would be harmed
by a particular decision ry find to influence or block a decision by the
NHTSA. The interim adoption of the ignition interlock and the delay of
the passive restraint requirement was the leading instance in which the
agency was forced to implement decisions not its own.
-It is also possible for affirmative political pressure to be put on
the NHTSA in areas in whi.:h it has decided to take no action or has
decided against adopting published proposals. This has been tried with
-success in standards for retreaded tires, school buses, and fuel system
integrity. But there seems to be a lack of groups and individuals with
-political power who wish to and are willing to use it to influence regu-
latory decisions towards more safety at higher cost and towards more
action in the presence of uncertainty, including the electorate.
-Congressional action on school bus safety and fuel system integrity was
exceptional. School children and people who burn to death in otherwise
:minor accidents elicit special concern in many people. The public's
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visible concern for the more common problems of automobile safety faded
faster than has its environmental concern.
5.3 Consequences of the Unresolved Problems
The NHTSA has by no means been able to resolve all of the problems
discussed in the previous section. Those that remain have affected both
the process and results of regulation.
The NHTSA has relied on performance measures that quantify hundreds
.of narrow aspects of safety performance. Risks of postcrash fire in
several collision modes, of side collision injuries, of several types of
brake failure, of injuries caused by open glove compartment doors, by
windshield glass, by control knobs, and by the steering column, of lamp
failures, of whiplash injury, etc. are all controlled independently.
This is in contrast to the concept of measures of overall on-the-road
safety performance, perhaps expressed directly in terms of the risks of
death and of each severity level of injury per accident and the risks of
becoming involved in an accident. This reliance on narrow performance
measures is natural. The various aspects of safe performance are fairly
independent. The overall risk can only be observed through accidents and
injuries caused by "failures" in narrow aspects of vehicle performance;
the overall risk can only be affected by changes in narrow aspects of
design; and prediction can only be made by considering the summed effect
of many narrow aspects of design and performance, unless reliance is
placed entirely on statistical analysis of field tests. Indeed, attempts
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to quantify and measure overall safety performance even using the
accident records of in-use automobiles have had only partial success; one
attempt produced only relative rankings of models within each size
26
class. The frequent use of the second approach to the first step in
developing a standard -- consideration of particular design improvements
-- also tends to encourage narrow performance measures.
The agency has also relied on performance measures that are at best
tenuously related to their corresponding aspects of on-tte-road perfor-
mance. Postcrash fires are regulated with flat-barrier c:rash tests which
are not realistic approximations to the more complex tye:s of collisions
that can occur between two cars or between a carand a fxed object.
Side impact protection is regulated by a static crush test that has
little relation to the dynamics of actual side collisions. The list
could go on.
There are several reasons for the questionable realism of many
standards. One is that actual accident situations are too varied and
complex to exhaustively simulate in an objective, repeatable compliance
test. So -the NHTSA has kept the simple flat barrier for its crash tests
rather than switch to a pole barrier or a contoured barrier. Another
reason is that the agency has not had much success in working backwards
from identified safety problems to the vehicle performance that would
assure their correction. The windshield zone intrusion standard and the
fuel system integrity standard contain the only examples of compliance
tests that directly address a broad deficiency in vehicle performance
with no expectations by the NRTSA as to what particular design approach
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would be used to achieve compliance. Usually the NHTSA has had to take
advantage of opportunities offered by particular design improvements, as
Chapter 4 suggested would be a reasonable approach. When the NHTSA
decides to force the use of a particular device or design approach, it
can choose to use a contrived performance test which is not realistic but
which does have the desired effect on design. Instead of a performance
requirement that would ensure that an engine hood does not open while the
car is in use, there is a standard requiring two-positicni engine hood
latches. Instead of a side impact protection standard u;ing a test dummy
that actually simulated the injury modes that are import:ant in side
impacts, there is a side door strength standard that in ffect requires
door beams. Again, the list could go on.
The use of both narrow performance measures and unrealistic perfor-
mance measures would not be a drawback if not for the effect of uncer-
tainty in predictions of impacts and lack of complete information about
the contents of the state of the art. If it were understood how the
narrow aspects of performance or design contributed to verall safety and
how the cost of a vehicle was determined by them, it would be possible in
principle to devise a set of narrow and unrealistic performance standards
that would have the effect of forcing into use any desired design and its
associated overall level of safety. But when uncertainty exists, as it
does in predicting the overall risk-reduction effect of most changes in
narrow aspects of performance, having to rely on narrow performance
measures introduces static ineffeciencies. Put simply, too much may be
being spent on preventing postcrash fires and not enough on better
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braking systems. The use of cost-benefit analysis would avoid this
situation, but the lack of certain predictions of impacts makes its use
impos sible.
Another inefficiency occurs when the HTSA, because of misestima-
tions of the safety impact of particular design approaches or because of
ignorance of better ones, forces the use of a less than efficient design
approach as a way of increasing a single narrow aspect of performance.
When this happens manufacturers may be unable to adopt a better design
because of the unrealistic performance measures that were used. Design
of collapsible steering columns is an example of this; there have been
claims that the present performance test in MVSS 203, while sufficient to
force the use of what was thought a desirable design in 1967, is now
preventing the use of cheaper, more effective designs.27
The lack of information on the consequences of the decisions it
might make means that it is often difficult for the NHTSA to make
decisions in which it can ave confidence. In the early years of the
NHTSA it was often considered sufficient that a performance change was
effective against the problem it addressed, without the extent of the
problem needing to be estimated accurately. In some cases there could be
doubt about whether a change would increase or decrease safety. For
example, the agency revised the seat belt standards to make it difficult
for front seat occupants to wear a lap belt without a shoulder belt, in
an attempt to increase shoulder belt use; it was not obvious that the
effect of the revision might not instead cause a counterproductive
reduction in lap belt use. Other areas involving occupant and driver
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behavior presented similar problems. But in general the difficulties in
precise impact prediction were not so manifest in those years. The
difficulties have become much more obvious as attempts at more
objectively rational and efficient regulation and planning have been made.
One response to uncertainty is to simply not make decisions or to
make decisions in the direction of the status quo. Since negative
decisions will usually be made before an NPRM is issued, they will not
often be visible. In at least one case, dealing with h,ydraulic brake
performance requirements for non-automobiles, the NHTSA formally
retracted an earlier positive decision on the grounds that it was
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uncertain as to whether benefits exceeded costs. Unc tainty has not
stopped all decisionmaking, however. It was mentioned earlier that many
of the NHTSA's decisions can only have been the result of subjective
judgments that the favorable.consequences of its decision would be worth-
While compared to the unfavorable consequences. While the NHTSA may feel
confident of these judgments, the estimates of effectiv ness implicit in
them are not always correct. Studies of the in-use effectiveness of the
side door beams which were forced into use by the side door strength
standard have,not been able to find any significant indication that they
are effective at all. This may be due partly to problems in measurement,
but it may also indicate that the beams are not nearly as effective as
the NHTSA once believed them to be. Review courts do not insist that the
NHTSA have succeeded in quantifying safety benefits. Standards must meet
the need for motor vehicle safety, but courts have upheld standards on
this point in cases where common sense indicated only that some improve-
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ment. in safety would result and the NHTSA's data was not much
29
better. Two adverse court ecisions, both on retreaded tires, did
criticize the NHTSA for not demonstrating a safety benefit before is-
suing standards. But both of these cases turned more on the practicabil-
ity aspects of the disputed standards that on safety impacts.3 0
Several of the unresolved problems in standard development may
occasionally combine to create a tacit bargaining situation between the
NHTSA and the regulated firms. Bargaining may occur when each has a
target outcome it would prefer, but would rather compromise that outcome
than accept some other threatened result that could be forced upon it by
the other bargainer. The ltITSA can be viewed as having in mind some form
of the performance requirements that it would like to impose on the
industry. The industry, in turn, would prefer to avoid further reg-
ulation. Although the NHTSA has the advantage of its legal authority,
itsposition is not entirely secure. Because of the NHTSA's frequent
inability to objectively dimonstrate safety benefits for some of its
proposals, it may often pfer to compromise than to be forced to
explain and defend its proposals in court or before fellow agencies.
Even if it feqls certain of victory in a court challenge, the possibility
of losing and the undesirability of becoming entangled and delayed can be
enough to make implied threats of an appeals suit a bargaining tool for
regulated firms. On the other hand, the manufacturers know that the
IHTSA does have the legal authority to issue standards that could be very
burdensome to them. They can challenge standards, but even if they win
an appeals suit it is at the expense of possibly adverse public atten-
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tion; There have been very few court challenges filed by the automobile
manufacturers compared to those filed by smaller equipment and parts
manufacturers. Also, it may be wise for the manufacturers to avoid
giving the NHTSA opportunities to resolve its own uncertainties about how
deferential review courts will be to its own actions. The manufacturers
should also avoid stalemating rulemaking to the point where Congress
finds it necessary to become involved.
The existence of a bargaining situation is important here because of
the effect it has on the outcome of standards development and rule-
making. It is obviously possible that the NHTSA might adopt a more
stringent starting position as a strategy. It may settle for less than
it actually wanted, though changes in its preferred outcome due to newly
acquired information can be difficult to distinguish from such conces-
sions. Also, in a situation where each party would prefer a settlement
to a conflict, arbitrary but obvious settlements are favored to
result. Traditional practice is usually an obvious point at which to
reach agreement. A flat barrier test at 30 mph was chosen for the wind-
shield zone intrusion standard not because that speed was found to be
necessary or est for correcting the intrusion problem, but because most
past tests in standards were done at that speed.
There are, of course, rulemaking cases in which there is no obvious
settlement agreeable to both sides but in which there is still a need to
reach tacit agreement. In cases like these the problems of reaching
agreement are worse and the arbitrariness of the outcome can remain.
When theW NHTSA has tried to change entrenched practices in areas where
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many.details of performance had to be revised, as it did in'the revision
of the hydraulic brake standard, the process has been complicated both by
the real costs of change and by the necessity to reach agreement on each
detail, for few of which did the NHTSA have an objective reason to favor
a particular result. The problems in choosing and agreeing on a higher
performance level when no single level is an obvious choice increases the
difficulties of achieving technological change.
The lack of an objective and workable criterion for deciding the
desirability of individual proposals has meant that decisiions are made
individually rather than systematically. There are two t;ymptoms of
unsystematic decisionmaking which are notable. One is that internal
agency consensus-building becomes advantageous to the NHTSA. If there is
no objective reason for deciding to take a particular action, internal
objections must be heard and either resolved or neutralized. The alter-
native is for the Administrator to exercise his discretion in ways that
will possibly appear arbitrary to outside observers, wiaout the 'assured
support of his agency. If internal agreement among key persons and
offices cannot be reached it risks less to take no positive action, with
the result bei,ng no technological change. The NHTSA has an elaborate
procedure for inter-office review of proposals that has the effect of
both spotting deficiencies in the work of individual offices and resol-
ving differences between them. 3 2 The second symptom is that decision-
making and the steps that proceed it are more comfortably done behind
closed doors. Since 1971 the NHTSA has not released its program plans.
It has rarely issued support papers for its rulemaking decisions although
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it prepares them for its own use. Only in the passive restraint
decisions by the two most recent Secretaries of Transportation have
formal analyses and position papers been published and defended.
A crucial consequence of the practical difficulties in telling what
decisions are objectively correct or incorrect is that the Administrators
of the NHTSA have by necessity and by opportunity taken advantage of the
range of judgment allowed them under the Safety Act. Some Administrators
have been aggressive regulators in the sense of being willing to impose
relatively high costs on car buyers and corporate stockholders for risk
reductions and of acting deliberately even when benefits and costs have
been uncertain. It is evicent that in the NHTSA's first few years,
standards were sometimes adopted to correct identified safety problems
with little consideration given to how frequent those problems were. In
those years, the Administrators no doubt accepted relatively large costs
to correct statistically minor problems, while knowing that they did not
know the actual size of te problems.
Other Administrators 'iave weighed the undesirable consequences of
regulation more heavily and have not acted as readily when quantitative
measures of bnefits and cost were lacking or uncertain. An attentive
reading of the report of the safety panel of the Interagency Task Force
on Motor Vehicle Goals Beyond 198033 reveals that by mid 1976 there
were new standards developed and ready to be proposed for indirect visi-
bility, direct visibility, rear signaling, headlighting, seat belt injury
criteria, and possibly side impact injury criteria and another major
braking amendment. Most of these areas are ones in which the NHTSA has
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alrehdy proposed standards; "n.e snot -f -e-ncy action on these early
proposals has been expected for some time. The basis on which to decide
the desirability of these proposals must be at least as complete as that
for standards adopted in earlier years, yet Administrators in recent
years have not acted on these standards.
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mobiles. The manufacturers with the resources to do safety R&D on a
large scale -- Ford and General Motors - treat their own research find-
ings as proprietary.
It is clear, however, that the total automotive R&D effort by the
automobile manufacturers dwarfs that of the NHTSA. While the large
domestic manufacturers are often accused of being slow to innovate, it is
true that historically they have had a mastery of the technology of their
products even when they were not actively using it. Beil,g in command of
automotive technology, even to the extent of themselves determining its
pace of change, has been one way the large manufacturere have reduced the
uncertainties of their industry, whether caused by compc.:ition, changing
demand, or regulation. A manufacturer is better able to comment on and
influence proposed regulations if he leads in the technology. Since the
safety of an automobile is determined by very many aspects of its design
and manufacture much of the manufacturer's R&D must be relevant to safety
even though it may not be oriented towards safety.
There are some incentives for the manufacturers to consciously
conduct safety R&D in particular. They have an incentive to find new
ways of meeting established safety standards at lower cost or with less
adverse impact on user convenience, style, or other attributes desired by
car buyers. The manufacturers can successfully compete in the market on
these aspects since consumers will respond to them. Some of these im-
provements can come from technologies that were previously within the
state of the art but unused. A manufacturer may choose to comply with a
standard initially by using a technology that is easy to switch to
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quickly but is not the best of those that are available. Eventually the
manufacturer will change to better available technologies. With short
lead times manufacturers are forced to resort to easily made changes and
wait until the next of the periodic redesign years to fully optimize each
model. Changes within the state of the art may also be made in response
to changing conditions, for example a new emphasis on fuel economy. But
improvements can also come from new technologies developed through R&D,
and the possibility of this in an incentive for the mantL.acturers to
invest in R&D directed along these lines. Although it i:; difficult for
an outsider to separate the two processes there are many examples where
one or the other has happened. When it seemed likely i the early 1970s
that a passive restraint standard would take effect within a few years,
several manufacturers investigated possible alternatives for meeting the
performance requirements without air bags. The bumpers first used to
meet MVSS 215 were heavier and less attractive in appearance than those
in use now; in addition, soft bumpers may gradually see ore use.
General Motors has reduced the cost of side door beams from $18 to $10
since they were introduced.1 The design of collapsible steering
2
columns was changed after their first year of universal use, and
3
several new designs have been suggested since. There have been
instances in which manufacturers have asked the NHTSA to amend a standard
so that an innovation could be used. The NHTSA amended the lighting
standard to allow rectangular headlamps as a styling innovation and to
permit the use of a different plastic for signal lamp lenses. The
hydraulic brake standard was amended to allow a non-split system that had
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CHAPTER SIX
SECOND OBJECTIVE: GENERATING NEW TECHNOLOGY
If the current state of the art does not include technologies that
would correct an identified safety problem, or if the technologies that
would do so are not considered desirable because of their cost or other
unattractive characteristics, it is natural to suppose that through
research and development a new technology might be found that would be
both effective and desirable. This thought occurred to afety advocates
in 1966. As a result, government R&D to advance the state of the art of
automobile safety engineering was one of the programs they fought for as
the Safety Act was drafted. The committee reports on the Act made their
victory explicit: the government was to develop its own expertise in
motor vehicle safety capable of making independent contributions to the
state of the art.
From the NHTSA's view of its assigned mission as reducing traffic
losses, it would appear that the public goal of all R&D is to generate
technology for improved safety. In fact, it is desirable that technolo-
gies be generated that are on the whole more socially attractive than the.
technologies that are presently in practice or which could be brought
into practice. The main component of the attractiveness of a safety
technology can be its ability to produce automobiles with lower taffic
risks, so greater safety may be part of the motivation for R&D. But new
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technologies which can provide the same level of risk as present ones but
have lower costs or less adverse effects on other attributes of a car are
also a worthwhile R&D goal. Generating new technologies with R&D costs,
just as adding more safety with known technologies costs. But it is
reasonable to suppose that investment in developing and then embodying a
new safety technology might turn out to be just as profitable - in terms
of the safety impact achieved -- as an equal investment which merely
embodies a known safety te,:inology.
The distinction made n the previous chapters was that a given level
and type of performance is achievable with known technology if manufac-
turers know how to create the vehicle designs, tooling, etc, that would
allow cars to be manufactured with that performance. The previous chap-
ters have not dealt with what is required to generate a new technology.
There can be wide variations in what it takes to do this. In some cases
advances in design and fabrication methods may be a prerequisite to a new
technology. For example, automated methods of seam welding would allow
greater structural crashw¢c.?thiness at lower cost. Or a new device or
material may allow greater safety; solid propellants have been developed
to replace compressed gas for use in air bags, with better performance.
In other cases, simply demonstrating for the first time a technology that
depends only on known techniques can effectively expand the state of the
art if no one were previously aware that it could be done. Similarly, if
there were uncertainty as to whether achieving a performance level were
possible, producing a design or a prototype vehicle with that performance
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advances the state of he art evnv til ; was discovered in the proc-
ess of doing so that no inventive concepts or new techniques were
necessary foi success.
There is a sense in which a new technology is generated when someone
discovers that a certain type of vehicle performance as measured in
controlled testing will correct an on-the-road safety problem. The
process of standards development discussed in Chapter-5 might be consid-
ered capable of generating new technologies in this sense.
The NHTSA's R&D has never been intende'd to replace industry R&D.
Instead the NHTSA's program is supposed to provide a yardstick for meas-
uring the industry's efforts, to stimulate more effort by industry, and
to fill in holes caused by the industry's failings. It is appropriate to
begin this chapter by examining the automotive industry's R&D before
considering the NHTSA's.
6.1 Industry R&D Activities
It is not possible to describe the substance of the R&D activities
of the domestic and foreign manufacturers, because little of the work
they do ever becomes public. The SAE does publish technical papers on
safety engineering by employees of the manufacturers, but these usually
only describe how a manufacturer went about engineering the design and
process changes needed to comply with a given standard. The sort of R&D
that would advance the state of the art does not often appear in the
trade press and does not appear in the designs of production auto-
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acceptable reserve capacity in case of partial failure. The agency was
in the process of allowing a transmission interlock as an alternative to
the ignition interlock when it was interrupted by the 1974 amendments to
the Safety Act.
There are also limited aspects and levels of safety that market
forces and product liability worries encourage without assistance from
regulation, and the manufacturers have an incerntive to pursue these with
R&D. The design of air bags will be only partly determined by the
requirements that the passive restraint standard will place on them.
Concerns about product liatility and competition will be the only incen-
tives for innovations that increase reliability and durability; the
passive restraint standard will not regulate either.
Safety R&D programs can and have been used by the manufacturers to
placate their critics. This was common around 1965 and 1966 when con-
gressional committees were attacking the industry for not doing enough
research that was explicitly related to safety. The gratis participation
in the NHTSA's Experimenta. Safety Vehicle program by General Motors and
Ford was no doubt also in part motivated this way. Ford at first
declined to participate and then agreed to do so after its competitor
did. While R&D programs that are motivated in this way can be expected
to be mostly for show, there is always the possibility that they might
stumble across something useful.
The manufacturers may even have an incentive at times to develop new
regulatory technology, i.e., techniques the NHrSA can use in its job of
controlling the design and performance of the manufacturers' products.
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This task would normally be expected to fall to the NHTSA. Some regula-
tory technology can also be used by the manufacturers in designing their
products and may be developed by them for that purpose. The SAE stan-
dards and recommended practices were developed for the convenience of the
industry but their test procedures still form the basis for the bulk of
the NHTSA's performance tests. A very good example of a manufacturer
doing sote of the NHTSA's work for it is that General Motors has
pioneered in anthropomorphic test dummies. It id this in part for its
own use, particularly during the period in which it considered marketing
cars with air bags; a good test dummy is a useful tool for designing an
air bag system even apart from compliance testing needs. General Motors
also evidently preferred, if the NHTSA were going to re&Lllate passive
restraints, that it do so well instead of poorly. By developing better
test dummies for the NTHSA General Motors made it easier for the agency
to regulate it, but it also protected itself from the even more burden-
some regulation which might have resulted from dependence on less
realistic and repeatable test dummies.
Equipment and parts manufacturers can in some cases have very strong
incentives to develop new safety technology. If they can develop an
add-on feature or one for which manufacturers must or might rely on them
for parts and the NHTSA then chooses to regulate it into universal use,
they may create a large and profitable market for their product in a way
that never is true for the automobile manufacturers themselves. Develop-
ment of the air bag was carried through a critical stage by parts sup-
pliers. Research on automatic braking is being kept going partly in
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hopes that a market for it ay eventually be created through regulation.
DuPont has developed silicon brake fluids that the manufacturers have
chosen not to use in new cars; a large market will be created if the
NHTSA ever decides that the advantages of silicon fluids outweigh those
of their aspects that the manufacturers find undesirable.
The automotive industry as a whole does not have the full incentive
that a perfect market would give it to pursue new safety technology,
despite the assorted and limited incentives described above. As long as
a market failure makes it Unrewarding for the manufacturers to build,
promote, and sell cars wit. the levels of safety that would be demanded
in a perfect market there rill be no compelling reason for them to find
better ways of doing it. The manufacturers have good incentives to meet
Standards that are irrevocably in place by their effective dates but they
db not have good reason to continually look for innovations that would go
beyond the safety performance required by present, and anticipated, stan-
dards. Since the present regulatory system can only mandate performance
that is practicable, or aready within the manufacturers' capabilities,
it annot encourage manufacturers to extend their capabilities as well as
& halrtket that rewarded such advances would.
the standards that have been issued so far have created a disincen-
tive ot industry R&D that would not have existed if problems in develop-
ibg good performance measures had been less intractable. It was ex-
plathed in Section 5.3 that the NHTSA's reliance on narrow and unreal-
istit performance measures, combined with its uncertainty as to safety
iamphts and its lack of full knowledge of the state of the art, creates
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inefficiencies in the safety standards. These inefficiencies also result
in a lack of incentives for innovations. Generally, if a manufacturer
cannot use a known and socially desirable technology to his own advantage
because of unrealistic performance requirements which effectively admit
only another technology, he has reduced incentives to invest in discover-
ing new socially desirable technologies as well. If the NHTSA were able
and willing to define broad performance measures instead of narrow ones,
the manufacturers might be able to discover and! take adv.ntage of favor-
able tradeoffs between narrow aspects of performance to educe the total
cost of achieving a given overall level of safety. Or t:ey might be able
to provide a higher required overall level of safety at the same cost as
for a lower level imposed through inefficient, narrow standards. The
examples given above in which the manufacturers have petitioned for
changes in standards to allow them to use other methods shows that stan-
dards can prevent innovations from seeing use. It is unknown how many
innovations were prevented from discovery because of the limitations of
the existing standards. The NHTSA's lack of success in standards
development means that it must carry a greater burden in the generation
of new technologies, since its standards deprive manufacturers of some
incentives to do R&D that they would otherwise have.
The existence of the regulatory regime can even discourage some
innovations that would have been forthcoming under the failed and unregu-
lated market. A safety feature that would have been profitable if
offered as an option but which would reduce profits if forced into use on
a manufacturer's entire production may never see any use at all and may
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never be the object of an R&D program. The risk of the NHTSA noticing
the feature and finding it more desirable than do car buyers may be too
great. Speculation suggests that something of this sort may be the
explanation for General Motor's early enthusiasm and late antipathy for
passive restraints. As a luxury option on Buicks and Cadillacs air bags
might conceivably be profitable; as a standard feature on Chevrolets they
almost certainly would not be. General Motors has not introduced a major
new safety feature on its cwn since it introduced side door beams.
Ford's one significant new idea for a safety feature was the ignition
interlock. Whether the mantufacturers have stopped the sort of R&D work
which produced the side door beam, whether they have continued with it
but have had no comparable successes, or whether they have discovered
comparable improvements that they have chosen not to use or publicize, is
a matter of conjecture. It is certainly possible that the manufacturers
may have discovered new technologies whose use they consider not pri-
vately profitable but which the NHTSA would consider desirable.
Since whatever safety R&D that the manufacturers do is not reported
publicly there is no way for the NHTSA's R&D to be used as a yardstick
for the industry's efforts. It is also impossible to identify gaps in
the industry's R&D that would be appropriate areas for government R&D.
The IHTSA must assume that any area in which it does not know of any
industry R&D program is not being explored by the manufacturers.
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6.2 The NHTSA's R&D Activitis
The NHTSA tends not to define as a separate category R&D aimed at
advancing the state of the art to create new and possibly desirable
alternatives for consideration in future standards development. In the
agency's view all of its R&D is related to present standards development.
Since the agency has started standards development in a great many
aspects of safety, most of its R&D is so related. Within this category,
however, there are differences. Much of what the agency calls R&D is
what the previous chapter calls information gathering: accident investi-
gation, biomechanics research, determination of performance levels neces-
sary to prevent accidents or mitigate injuries, experimental or analyt-
ical estimation of the effectiveness of proposals for standards, testing
and demonstrating that proposals are within the state of the art, learn-
iiig what the industry already knows. This kind of R&D is very closely
supportive of standards development that is aimed solely at getting known
technologies into practice. Demonstrating that proposals are within the
state of the art may occasionally make them so, if the demonstration
resolves uncertainties. Another large part of the agency's R&D is aimed
at developing new regulatory technology for its own use in standards
development, rulemaking, and enforcement. This includes R&D on objective
performance tests, anthropomorphic test dumries, accident investigation
techniques, compliance testing shortcuts, etc.
The NHTSA has done some R&D that was intended to achieve safety
performance that previously had not been achieved, and to develop design
approaches that had never been tried before. The focus of this research
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generally has been determined by safety problems that the agency has
thought to have high priority. Much of it has dealt with restraint
systems and structural crashworthiness. Examples from restraint R&D
include improved inflation techniques for air bags, air bags for motor-
cycles, inflatable head restraints, inflatable seat belts, passive belts,
seat belts with force-limiting devices to increase their energy absorp-
tion, seat belts intended for use by pregnant women and for small child-
ren, collapsible dashboard structures and steering columns, and antici-
patory crash sensors for better actuation of inflatable restraints.
Structural crashworthinesE examples include techniques like plastic hinge
design for getting more er!rgy absorption with available material and
space, structures for deflecting the engine under the passenger compart-
ment instead of through it, and novel side structures. There has been a
long series of contracts that have developed structural improvements for
frontal, side, rear, and roll-over collisions by modifying limited
portions of production molels from each size class. It is not completely
clear how much of this latter type of research has advanced the state of
the art and how much of it has merely explored or documented the existing
state of the art. The NHTSA has been interested in the possibility of
passive protection at 50 mph for many years and has done R&D on matching
structural crashworthiness and restraint system improvements in ways that
would make this possible.
Besides investigating pedestrian injury mechanisms and criteria in
an effort to determine what performance would be required to provide
pedestrian protection, the NHTSA has looked for ways of modifying auto-
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mobiles to provide protection. The research has included work on soft
bumpers, padded engine lids, and optimal front-end profile. While not
actually paying for development work on radar-actuated braking systems
the agency has encouraged development by issuing contracts for evaluation
of systems developed by others. In an area in which manufacturers have
little reason to be interested, the NHTSA has investigated ways of
achieving greater car-to-car crash compatiblity. The NHTSA's ultrasonic
testing technique for tire casings is a good example of ts development
of a new technology that would provide greater safety. 'Jith the tech-
nique retreaders could raise the quality of their products at little
extra cost by selecting used casings more carefully. Tl NHTSA could
impose performance standards on retreaded tires that earlier would have
been unattainable at reasonable cost.
The research just described has been aimed at improvements to
vehicle subsystems. The NHTSA has also conducted research and develop-
ment on entire vehicles. The Experimental Safety Vehicle and Research
Safety Vehicle programs have been the two largest of all the agency's R&D
projects. The ESV program was many things to many people, but in retro-
spect it seems to have been intended to prove that a large increment in
structural crashworthiness was within the state of the art. The NHTSA
set quite stringent specifications for crashworthiness and asked its
contractors to meet them subject to weight and other constraints. The
contractors generally achieved the crashworthiness goals except for some
problems in refining air bag designs, but seriously exceeded weight
targets. The construction of the American ESVs apparently did not make
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or prove anything possible that was not thought possible previously,
although without doubt no one had built automobiles to specifications
like those set for the project and no one had used some of the design
approaches used by the contractors.4 The ESV program was supposed to
develop a systems engineering approach to making optimal tradeoffs
between different aspects of safety performance. 5 If it had, that
would have constituted a quite significant new regulatory technology. In
fact, though, each aspect cf performance was controlled directly by the
tSV specifications, so no tradeoff discovery was needed or allowed from
the contractors.
.The Research Safety Vehicle program was designed after the failures
of the SV program were evident.6 The RSVs are in a smaller vehicle
Bite class than were the ESVs and the NHTSA made it much clearer to the
tSV contractors that the weight constraint was a real one. There is some
tabiguity as to the intentions behind the RSV program as well, however.
It is ot clear whether the RSV program is intended to find and prove the
feasibility of the most dirable balance between safety, cost, fuel
economy, and emissions for the mid 1980s or whether the program is itself
1ttended to produce the new technology which will make it possible to
t* h oals for that period that will or have been set elsewhere. There
'hs been some disagreement between the NHTSA's Office of M6tor Vehicle
lrograms and its Office of Research and Development on this definitional
issue and bn whether the RSV project would yield results that could be
used in standards development as it progressed or only once completed. 7
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Two American RSVs are being constructed. One, by. Calspan, is a
modification of a Chrysler Simca. What its designers have done is to
upgrade the structural crashworthiness of the Simca in the most advanta-
geous ways they could find, subject to limitations on weight and cost.
They.have, in effect, taken advantage of the most desirable technologies
available. The result is substantially greater crashworthiness with
relatively little weight penalty. This is in contrast to the ESV
project, where designers worked to fixed targets in crashworthiness. The
designers of the Calspan RSV boast about how realistic it is compared to
the ESVs. The vehicle is conventional in basic design; its features are
well within the state of the art of design and manufacturing. Chrysler
believes a close version of the car could be successfully mass produced
and sold.
The second American RSV, being built by Minicars, is quite differ-
ent. Its structural crashworthiness is comparable to the other RSV but
it is unconventional in design, materials, and manufacturing techniques.
The relevance of this RSV to mass production and sale of safer auto-
mobiles is not obvious but may exist.
A Volkswagen Integrated Research Vehicle, which would have been an
RSV if Volkswagen had won its bid for one of the NTHSA contracts, is like
the Calspan RSV in that it is essentially a modified production vehicle,
in this case a Volkswagen Rabbit. The modification has been done with
careful attention to opportunities for improved safety. The safety
performance of this car is similar to that of the other two.
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.All three vehicles are being used as contexts for the development or
refinement of new subsystem technologies and devices: advanced air bags,
passive belts, inflatable belts, force-limiting belts, interior padding,
anti-skid brakes, radar warning systems, rigid foam as a structural
element, etc. They also serve as a context for refinement of some
damageability, fuel economy, and materials recycling concepts. But as a
whole the RSV program has just very carefully selected and integrated
technologies that were already within the state of the art (with the.
possible exception of the Minicars RSV which may still be outside the
state of the art of automobile manufacturing when the project is com-
pleted). The effect of doing this selection and integration for the
Calspan and Volkswagen RSVs might legitimately be called new technology
because it has demonstrated what net result is achievable and resolved
uncertainties. But if it is a new technology, it may only be new tech-
nology for producing safer Chrysler Simcas and Volkswagen Rabbits. It is
unclear that the RSV project would make it easier to perform the same
modification process on another car of the same weight class or to a car
from another class. It is also unclear that if the crashworthiness of a
Ford Pinto were optimized subject to similar weight and cost constraints
it would give the same level of performance as the Calspan RSV, or that
achieving the same performance in a Pinto would have the same cost
penalties as it does in a Simca.
The NHTSA has not devoted a very large portion of its research
budget to the type of research described above, The ESV and RSV programs
have been by far the largest portion of this type of research. One good
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reason why the agency has not pursued new technology with more effort is
that its rulemaking activities have demanded most of the available R&D
resources for gathering information and producing new regulatory tech-
nologies. Simply discovering what is within the state of the art and
what it can accomplish towards greater safety takes considerable effort
for an agency that must rely on contractors to do its reseach.
Under the interpretation adopted in Chapter 4, the objective of
agency R&D aimed at generating new safety technology is :o provide new
alternatives that might be found desirable enough to be 'forth forcing
into practice via standards. The NHTSA's R&D has not prduced any new
technology which subsequently was forced into use on aut mobiles. In ten
years, there has been no standard issued by the NHTSA for automobiles
which, but for earlier R&D performed by the NHTSA, could not have been
met by the manufacturers on its effective date. The NHTSA also has never
required the use of a device it was the first to develop. There three
reasons why this has been so.
The first is that automobile design and manufacturing is a mature
technology that probably has few surprises in store for itself. There
are exceptions to this statement, notably in materials, engine technol-
ogyb and automated manufacturing processes. Almost all of the concepts
vhich have appeared in NHTSA rulemaking proposals and research projects
- air bags, polarized headlamps, three-beam headlamps, periscopes, etc.
-- vere around as ideas before the NHTSA came into existence. Any major
nev concepts that will be developed to the point of being part of the
state of the art will probably be developed by firms in the industry.
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The second reason is that many of the advances that were made by the
NHTSA's R&D were ones which were not appropriate for regulation. There
are two ways in which R&D can be inappropriate. One was is that the
NHTSA's regulatory tools and abilities may be inadequate to handle the
technology developed in R&D. A manufacturer, who can control every
design detail and use subjective judgments in testing performance, can
put into practice any known technology he desires and can afford. The
NHTSA's restriction to objective performance standards un.ans it cannot do
this as easily. For example, the NHTSA's R&D Office haE experimented to
find the front-end profile which minimizes pedestrian injuries as deter-
mined in computer simulations. It is unlikely that a riew court would
allow the NHTSA to issue a standard requiring that profile; the available
anthropomorphic test dummies are not suitable for using in a pedestrian
protection test, either. The complexity of regulating a technology can
also exceed the ~WHTSA's capabilities. It would require a very complex
set of standards for the NTSA to force Chrysler to-make all of its
Simcas like the Calspan RSV, because of the number of design details for
which performance tests would have to be devised. The second way that
the results of an R&D prtojett can be inappropriate is if the NHTSA would
never find their imposition on the manufacturers desirable. If the NHTSA
had issued an equipment standard for special seat belts for pregnant
women it is doubtful how many would have purchased and installed them.
The NHTSA would never make automobile manufacturers install them in every
car.
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The third reason is that regulatory decisionmakers have so far
chosen not to adopt some of the R&D results which might have been suit-
able for incorporation by standard. Of course, regulation is not yet
cempleted; the RSV projects are supposed to influence rulemaking in the
early 1980s. If 50 mph passive protection were ever mandated, manufac-
turers might, for example, tind the NHTSA's structural crashworthiness
research useful.
6,3 Technology Forcirg
The pattern of regulation as discussed so far assumes either that
when a standard for a particular performance level is issued, manufac-
turers will already be able to meet that level on time through a process
of technology embodiment or that the NHTSA does the R&D needed to
generate a technology capable of providing that level before it issues
the tandard. There is another pattern possible, that of "technology
forcing", In this second attern, the NHTSA would set a performance
level that it believed to be "necessary for safety" but which it knew or
suspected could not be met within the current state of the art,i.e., that
technology embodiment would be insufficient to enable the manufacturers
to comply. It would then be incumbent on the manufacturers to do the R&D
needed to generate a new technology capable of achieving compliance if
such a technology were at all possible. In this way the NHTSA would be
oble to harness the massive creative capacity of the manufacturers
instead of relying on the admittedly less massive capacity of its con-
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tractors. Technology forcing also shifts the costs of developing a new
technology onto the manufacturers' and off of the NHTSA's research
budget. Technology forcing as described here has been the distinguishing
characteristic of the regulation of automobile emissions since passage of
the Clean Air Act Amendments of 1970, which set what were believed to be
the emissions levels necessary for the protection of public health inde-
pendent of considerations of what was thought to be technologically
possible at the time.8 There are traces of technology forcing in
automobile fuel economy regulation as well.
There has been some dispute as to whether technology forcing has
beeh, could be, or should be used in automobile safety regulation. In
regard to the question of whether it ever has been used, the answer must
be no, at least not intentionally. The only case that came close was
with the first version of the passive restraint standard, which pressed
hard upon the manufacturers. In that case, it was clear that the NHTSA
believed that air bags were a known technology capable of achieving
compliance with the performance requirements of the standard; indeed, in
large part the performance requirements had been designed with the
calabiities of the air bag in mind. The passive restraint standard did
place in 'enornmous burden of technology embodiment onto the manufacturers;
under the original leadtime schedule it may have even been physically
impossible to comply in time and if compliance were possible the form it
tobk ight not have been very desirable. The size of the burden has led
some to think that new technology was having to be generated. This was
not so. The manufacturers were generating new technology, but it was
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technology that would make compliance less burdensome t ' themselves.
Compliance as such was already possible, though costly.
The court of appeals which remanded the standard upheld the NHTSA's
determination that ir bag technology was sufficiently developed to make
compliance possible even though substantial commitment of resources to
9
technology embodiment would be needed. Unfortunately, the court of
appeals confused the cases of (1) a technology which exists and is in
practice, (2) a technology which exists, is not in actual practice but
which could be put into universal practice through technology embodiment,
and (3) a performance requirement for which no technology currently
exists and hence must be found through invention and R&D. Because of the
confusion the court's opinion is extremely susceptible to a reading that
technology forcing is allowed by the 1966 Safety Act and that it was in
fact occurring in the case of passive restraints. While such a reading
is comforting to safety advocates, and to the NHTSA, it is not consistent
with the practicability requirement of the Safety Act. Practicability
has been treated as a factual issue by every court: either a standard is
practicable, i.e., it can be met by the effective date if sufficient
resources are devoted to the effort, or it is not practicable. The
Safety Act requires standards to be practicable 'when issued. The
essential characteristic of the generation of new technologies is that
sometimes efforts at t succeed and other times they do not. A standard
can hardly have been practicable when issued if by the time of its
erfective date its performance requirements have been found physically
impossible to meet in mass production. If the ability to comply by the
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effective date is a certainty the day a standard is issued,'achieving
compliance is a matter of technology embodiment, not of the generation of
a new technology.
The NHTSA had never issued a standard for which it believed com-
pliance depended on generation of new technology. It may well have been
mistaken in that belief in some cases and thus inadvertantly attempted to
use technology forcing. Nor has the NHTSA shown any interest in using
technology forcing. The industry, of course, believes technology forcing
Should ot be used as a regulatory approach. Some safety advocates have
Uepttessed more favorable thoughts on whether technology forcing should be
ttbed, though it is possible to interpret their statement:; as no more than
up-pbrt for igorous regulation based on technology that they believe
Already exists.l 0 Safety advocates have always tended to have a more
'pltimistic view of how much is possible with existing technology than do
neot thet groups involved in automobile safety regulation.
A i-te cti t'ical appraisal of whether technology fo-:cing would be a
good way to generate new technologies shows several problems with the
·probach. or one, it is probably illegal under the Safety Act, although
wii's tin be changed and even under existing law the courts might allow
Qt. etond, it is most effective when broad and realistic performance
ehas'ures are available, as they have been in emissions where all that
atters is what comes out of the vehicle, and least effective when the
a'ity 'v;ailable performance measures are narrow, as they are in automobile
%afety. This is because a broader performance measure admits improve-
enits from a wider set of innovations. Third, since technology forcing
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must' necessarily be begun under uncertainty, the agency using it must be
able and willing to take advantage of new information as it develops and
to abandon goals that prove infeasible or too expensive. In particular,
the agency must be able to distinguish between a socially desirable
technology and a technology that will achieve the originally required
performance level. Finally, technology forcing is perhaps the most
unpleasant form of regulation possible from the regulated industry's
viewpoint. The political opposition to this type of reglation would be
more determined than the opposition to other, less unpleasant types.
The history of automobile emissions regulation is .1 demonstration of
the problems inherent in technology forcing. Of course, it can work to
generate new technology; new emissions control technology has been
developed since 1970 and more seems on its way. Whether the cost of
generating it through technology forcing was worthwhile and whether the
technology that has been generated was the best that could have been are
as much debated as whether the approach should have beenl used at all.
Technology forcing in emissions regulation has not achieved the levels of
emissions thought to be "necessary for health" in 1970, however. The
1977 Amendments to the Clean Air Act abandoned the original goal for
emissions of oxides of nitrogen.
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CHAPTER SEVEN
SUMMARY, CONCLUSIONS, AND RECOMMENDATIONS
The appraisal at the end of the overview given in Chapter 3 sug-
gested that on initial review not much change in the characteristics of
automobiles has been achieved by automobile safety regulation since the
promulgation of the initial safety standards. These initial standards
were unique in that they were effectively put in place by Congress rather
than by the NTSA; the achievement they represent is not one that can be
credited to the continuing regulatory regime. Once established and given
a start with the initial standards, the institutions and procedures
established to partially collectivize design decisions for automobiles
seemed on first appraisal not to have caused anything more than quite
restricted effects on automobile design. But even their limited accom-
plishments -- bumpers, hydraulic brakes, fuel system integrity, side door
beams, windshield zone intrusion - came about only through a process of
regulation that was usually confused and factious.
Both of these observations in the earlier appraisal are true and few
people familiar with the NHTSA's history would contest them. The purpose
of the intervening chapters has been to examine the process and accom-
plishments of automobile safety regulation in relation to inherent prob-
lems and possibilities, since it would be unfair and unhelpful to judge
accomplishments apart from possibilities. Having made that examination
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it is possible to summarize and to offer some conclusions and recom-
mendations on automobile safety regulation.
7.1 Summary
In 1966 Congress began a new regulatory regime in automobile
safety. The National Traffic and Motor Vehicle Safety Act, passed in
that year, established a mechanism which could substitute collective
decisions made by government regulators for private decisions made by
automobile manufacturers and buyers. Responsibility for using this
mechanism was given to the Secretary of Transportation and through him to
the Administrator of the National Highway Traffic Safety Administration
(NRTSA). Congress imposed only weak constraints on the motor vehicle
safety standards which the NHTSA might issue. Standards must be prac-
ticable, be appropriate to the item regulated, be stated in terms of
objective performance criteria, and meet the need for safety. The
authority granted the NHTSA was quite broad and thus regulation could
conceivably affect many aspects of automobile design and performance.
Congress also directed that a particular set of existing private and
government standards, representing familiar safety features all of which
had previously seen at least scattered use, be promulgated as initial
safety standards. It left decisions to issue further standards to the
HTSA's initiative.
The goals which Congress gave to the new regulatory regime were more
symbolic than operational. It set as the objective of the Safety Act the
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reduction of traffic accidents, injuries, and fatalities but qualified
that objective by requiring the NHTSA to consider the reasonableness of
cost, feasibility, and lead time. It explicitly noted that the goal of
greater safety was not to be a reason for eliminating inherently less
safe types of automobiles like convertibles. It thus implicitly admitted
that considerations of user satisfaction as well as cost might affect the
nominal goal of injury and fatality reduction. However, the NHTSA for
the most part has held onto the "bottom line" interpretit:ion of its
mission as the simple reduction of traffic fatalities ard injuries. It
is forced by law to consider both costs and safety impac:s of its deci-
sions to issue standards and has generally done so, but nly recently has
it attempted to objectively weigh the two against each other through
cost-benefit analysis. These attempts have not been entirely sponta-
neous; they were in part the result of pressures from other parts of the
executive branch. The NHTSA has not relinquished the "bottom line"
interpretation during this recent period.
For the NHTSA to successfully have a beneficial effect on the design
of automobiles it must perform four tasks. It must develop the perfor-
mance requirements which comprise the technical substance for standards.
It must analyze and predict the impacts of a decision to adopt a proposed
standard. It must make a decision to adopt the standard. And it must be
willing and able to defend its decision successfully against political
and legal challenges.
There are many problems that must be faced in completing the first
task of developing the performance requirements for new standards, all
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essentially technical. Accidents must bh investigated and analyzed to
discover safety problems; injury mechanisms must be studied to discover
what vehicle performance is required to ensure that human tolerances are
not exceeded; objective performance measures and tests must be developed;
etc. The NHTSA tries to set requirements on the performance of an auto-
mobile as a whole which will ensure the correction of identified safety
problems. It has instead more frequently had to set requirements on the
performance of individual pieces of equipment and to in effect specify
design approaches rather than minimum performance levels.
Second, there are problems in predicting impacts which the NHTSA has
not overcome. Predicting the future is always difficult. In the case of
automobile safety it is made difficult by a lack of information on
presently occurring accidents and ignorance about the effect of proposed
modifications on the frequency and severity of those accidents. The
prediction of the impact of accident avoidance modifications is comp-
licated by interactions with driver behavior and highway environment,
prediction of the impact of crashworthiness modifications by the vast
number of accident types and the impossibility of experimentally testing
injury production in human subjects. The NHTSA cannot estimate costs as
well as can the manufacturers, who have the advantages of experience and
the information needed as input to estimates. Predictions of long run
costs, which eventually dominate the more immediate short run costs, are
made uncertain for both the NHTSA and the manufacturers by the pos-
sibility of cost-reducing innovations.
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The third task which Congress left to the NHTSA was to decide the
desirability of adopting individual proposed standards. The NHTSA cannot
make these decisions mechanically, because Congress did not give it an
objective decision rule for deciding the reasonableness of costs and
because the NHTSA rarely is successful in confidently predicting cost and
safety impacts. In the first few years of the agency, costs were appar-
ently required only to be "reasonable" and safety impacts did not have
to be quantified before affirmative decisions weIre made. Later attempts
at cost-benefit analysis of proposals made it more obvious that uncer-
tainty in impacts was a major problem in decisionmaking. It seems evi-
dent from the NHTSA's history that, faced with the lack of a decisively
controlling decision rule and the lack of certain knowledge of the out-
comes of alternative decisions, different Administrators of the NHTSA
have made decisions that are not fully consistent with one anothers'.
Outright repudiations of past decisions have occurred in only a few
cases. But early Administrators made decisions to adopt and propose
standards that probably would not have been made by more recent Adminis-
trators.
The NHTSA has not been entirely successful in the fourth task. It
has had some of its decisions overruled by Congress and the White House.
It has won some and lost some of the legal challenges to its standards as
well.
The NHTSA should be interested in generating new technologies as
well as in forcing adoption of already known technologies. The auto-
mobile industry does not have much incentive to invest in R&D that would
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discover and develop new safety technologies or to adopt them once
developed. The NHTSA has no way to force the industry to do R&D that is
not specifically aimed at compliance with an actual or anticipated stan-
dard. Most of the NHTSA's own research budget has had to be devoted to
gathering and analyzing information and to developing new regulatory
technologies. It has done some R&D on new automobile safety tech-
nologies, but none of them has been forced into practice via a safety
standard. The NHTSA's Research Safety Vehicle project has achieved that
considerable improvement ill crashworthiness without making the patently
outrageous sacrifices in o:her desirable attributes that appeared in its
earlier Experimental Safet? Vehicle project. The trade off between
increased safety and increased cost represented by the modifications to a
Chrysler Simca during the RSV project may be more efficient than any that
were known to be possible before the project. An equal amount of R&D may
be needed for other models before they can be modified in similar ways,
however.
The NHTSA's R&D efforts must deal with problems of uncertainty
familiar in all R&D programs, whether in the private or public sector.
The agency cannot know which R&D projects will be successful in
developing new technologies. The NHTSA also faces the same analytical
difficulties in evaluating a new technology which might result from an
R&D project as it does in evaluating alternatives involving only well-
known technologies. It is thus difficult for the agency to rationally
and efficiently allocate the limited resources it has available for
exploratory R&D.
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Added to these complications in R&D are ones peculiar to a regu-
latory agency. The NHTSA must rely on outside contractors to perform its
R&D. This creates coordination problems with which most private firms do
not have to cope. Research contractors who are not actively involved in
manufacturing naturally are not as familiar with automotive technology as
the manufacturers. The fact that exploratory R&D and research needed to
support active rulemaking are handled by the same office within the NHTSA
has allowed R&D projects wse exact purposes were ill-defined to proceed to
completion. Such projects c:an easily produce results that have little use
in either supporting rulemiC£ing or generating new technology.
The outcome of a decac of regulation by the NHTSA under these
circumstances is that few standards have been issued since 1968. The
standards that have been issued cover limited aspects of safety performance.
In some cases, like collapsible steering columns, present standards may
be preventing reductions in manufacturing costs, injuries, and fatalities.
The only standard on structural crashworthiness in side impacts, the side
door strength standard, forced the adoption of a design approach that may
not be nearly as effective as the agency must have once believed it to be.
The recently issued passive restraint amendment will be the first standard
to force the use of a safety feature that had not seen any use prior to
the start of rulemaking. That amendment will have been thirteen years
th the making by the time its first stage takes effect in the 1985 model
year.
On the whole, the version of centralized decisionmaking which has
developed since 1966 has not brought about any major changes in the
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design and performance of automobiles. Of course, Congress did not claim
in 1966 to be empowering the NHTSA to take over the design functions of
private industry. Private decisions still design automobiles. But
Congress did confer broad powers on the NTSA to affect the safety
related aspects of vehicle design and performance. Public decisions made
since 1966 on the basis of this power have had quite limited impact even
on these aspects, however. The safety features found on automobiles made
this year coincide closely with ones that could be found on 1968 models.
7.2 Discussion and Cnclusions
The initial safety standards forced the adoption of much of the most
efficient, most easily integrated safety technology that had been
developed by the automobile industry up to that time. These initial
standards did not exhaust the state of the art, however, and neither have
the subsequent safety standards. The NHTSA's R&D projects, its
unfinished rulemakings, ar.d industry R&D show that the state of the art
still contains unused technologies. Not all of these technologies are
accessible by regulation. Some, like handling and stability improve-
ments, are best put into practice using subjective criteria; the restric-
tion to objective performance requirements makes it very-difficult for
regulation to force these into use. Others, like the technology repre-
sented in the structural modifications made in the Calspan-Chrysler RSV,
may be so particular to the different characteristics of individual
models that they could be forced into universal use only with exceedingly
complex sets of standards.
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Of the remaining technologies many could have been forced into use
with safety standards. True, it would have required standards develop-
ment to accomplish this and the NHTSA was occupied for some time in the
early 1970s with a few standards to which it gave higher priority,
notably passive restraint and braking amendments. One reason that more
has not been accomplished by the NHTSA is that it has been given limited
resources. But there have been many standards -- which would have caused
technological change - thi.t the NHTSA has proposed and developed to the
point where they assuredly met the constraints of the Safety Act but that
the agency has not adopted. There must be many other changes for which
standards could have been developed to the same point. Much of what has
not been accomplished in the way of technological change in the last ten
years was not done not because of the inability of the regulators to
develop suitable standards nor because review courts prevented it, but
because of deliberate choices not to accomplish it. These choices occa-
sionally have been made by people other than the designated regulators
but many of them were made by the latter. Some Administrators may have
been chosen for their posts because of accurate expectations about how
they would make decisions. This possibility does not change the fact
that one reason why more has not been done has been decisions by those
who have been given decisionmaking responsibility.
The individual decisions of the officials responsible for regulation
have been a limiting factor in the pace with which unused technologies
have been forced into use. This is not to say that more regulation would
have been better. Indeed, the chronic uncertainty in predictions of the
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safety impact and cost of forcing the adoption of unused technologies
make it very difficult to confidently say whether each or any of the
missing changes would have been socially desirable. Some, for example
the set of changes represented by the Experimental Safety Vehicles, were
clearly not desirable. Others, like periscope devices, present more
difficult decisions. Uncertainty has no doubt made it difficult for
regulators to make decisions comfortably; it should also give their
critics pause. And, of course, there is the issue of what the criterion
of social desirability should be.
Sensible welfare economists long ago abandoned to foolish welfare
economists and amateur and professional moral philosophers all specu-
lation about the existence of an objectively valid criterion of social
desirability. Normative economic theory claims only that for any inef-
ficient state of affairs there is an efficient one that is preferable.
The choice among the possible efficient states must always be made by
political processes, either actively or by default to the existing state.
In cases like automobile safety regulation, this kind of political
choice translates into the more specific question of how much corporate
stockholders and new car buyers will have to pay for risk reductions that
benefit a larger group that may include themselves but also many others.
The answer to that question determines whether particular standards, the'
changes in technology they will force, and the resulting cost increases
and risk reductions are "desirable"; alternatively, decisions to adopt
standards, if made efficiently and consistently, combine to define some
implicit answer to that question. One complication in automobile safety
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regulation is that in many decisions that must be made, the costs and
risks reductions are unknown or uncertain. Thus, political decisions
must be made not only on the costs that will be incurred in order to
reduce traffic risks - in crude terms, on the value of a human life -
but also on how action will be taken in particular instances when ignor-
ance and uncertainty cannot be corrected.
According to accepted constitutional theory, Congress is the proper
body for making these decisions. Congress could not and did not make
these decisions in 1966. Occassionally it has asserted its authority to
make individual regulatory decisions, but it is ill-suited to do this
regularly. Instead, Congress has left the decisions to the Secretary of
Transportation and through him to the Administrator of the NHTSA. The
direction it has given the Administrator and the constraints it imposed
on his decisions by providing for judicial review have not been suffi-
cient to determine his decisions for him. The Administrator necessarily
formulates original policy when he decides to adopt or reject proposals
for standards.
The NHTSA does not like to admit that it is formulating original
policy, even though the Safety Act clearly granted it discretion to do
so. The NHTSA, and most safety advocates, has tried to maintain the view
that Congress set down the guiding policy as the reduction in the "bottom
line" of national traffic accident statistics. The NHTSA has always paid
attention to costs and to other disadvantages associated with new stan-
dards. But it has not admitted that its decisions, if made consistently,
correspond to some implicit value of risk reductions. During the period
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when cost-benefit analysis has been given a role in the agency's deliber-
ations, the NHTSA has put foward a somewhat inconsistent explanation of
the reasons for using it. When the NHTSA estimated the societal costs of
traffic accidents, it emphasized that it was not claiming that the esti-
mated cost should be interpreted as implying a correct expenditure for
safety standards or a value for human life. But when the NHTSA explains
decisions published in the Federal Register in terms of costs that out-
weigh benefits, it does seem to imply that it has found an objective way
to balance the two. If the value individuals place on the risk reduc-
tions provided them by a new standard were known, it wotlLd still be
necessary to make a policy decision on how the uneven distribution of
impacts from a decision would be treated. To not consider the distribu-
tion important is itself a policy decision. When individuals' values are
not known the use of a particular value for human life as a surrogate for
them, which the NHTSA's cost-benefit analyses do in fact use, is also a
policy decision. Whether the NHTSA uses cost-benefit analysis or whether
it considers the reasonableness of cost without quantifying the impacts
of a decision, it formulates policy.
The existence of uncertainty in predictions of impacts means that
policy decisions must also replace what would ideally have been objec-
tive, technical analysis of the consequences of issuing new standards.
To accept the use of subjective estimates of effectiveness in formal
analyses amounts to the same thing as subjective decisionmaking without
formal analyses. Policy judgments are made in both cases. Formal impact
analyses may make the lines between objective analysis of impacts, sub-
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jective estimates of impacts, and purely policy decisions about the
desirability of the impacts more explicit, but they cannot replace policy
decisions.
In theory, Congress can legitimately set national policy because of
its ties back to the electorate. Congress in turn tied the Administrator
to political realities by placing the position in a Cabinet department
and making him a political appointee subject to Senate confirmation. By
doing so, it left the policy decisions in automobile safety regulation
open to political influence exercised through several chnnnels. The play
of such influence during the process of regulation is supposed to ensure
the quality of its substance, according to some theories of democratic
goverment. The Administrator is not tied very closely to the
electorate, however; he is chosen by a Secretary who is chosen by a
President, who is .in turn chosen by the electorate for reasons other than
the correspondence between his and their positions on the set of
decisions that will have to be made in automobile safety regulation. As
a result, the regulatory process has usually involved oly the parties
immediately concerned: the NHTSA, the regulated firms, the insurance
industry, institutionalized public interest groups, and a few subcom-
mittees of Congress. The process of regulation has been characterized by
fundamental conflicts between interests and ideologies, as is the process
of most legislation. Uncertainty as to the implications of most deci-
sions has also aggravated the conflict between individuals and groups
advocating different decisions. The process has perhaps been more openly
quarrelsome for the lack of a stabilizing involvement by a majority of
public opinion.
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The experience with the last ten years of automobile safety regu-
lation does not mean that decisionmaking that has been collectivized
through this type of regulatory structure cannot get anything done. It
only means that there must be decisions to get things done and a willing-
ness to do it even when there are doubts about what exactly is being
accomplished.
Safety advocates, including some congressmen, like to claim that a
political decision made by ongress ten years ago has been preserved in
law and that a lack of regu-latory aggressiveness on the part of the
Administrator borders on subversion of the NHTSA's statutory mandate.
This is good polemics but ad theory. What the 1966 victory of the
automobile safety advocates established was the regulatory regime; that
is preserved in law and gives the advocates of safety a lasting advan-
tage. The regime must rely on present political realities for its
decisions on individual proposals, however.
The present political reality seems to be that the majority of the
public is not actively den.anding more automobile safety regulation. If
the vote of the Safety Act were taken now the tally would not be
unanimous, as it was in 1966. This does not mean that the regulatory
regime cannot accomplish any changes in automobile design and perfor-
mance. Once in office an Administrator who chooses to do so can accom-
plish significant changes, as the current passive restraint case will
likely demonstrate. Although the public is not demanding more regu-
lation, it will not resist most types of changes. The ignition interlock
experience showed that car buyers and users will not immediately accept
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some changes which force then to alter the ay they use their cars.
Their toleration of most other types of change4, even those that raise
the prices of new cars, can allow an Administrator to accomplish a good
deal.
What the experience with the past ten years of automobile safety
regulation does show is that improvements in the process of regulation
will be needed if its substance is to be more assuredly beneficial. An
Administrator willing to make and defend policy decisions in the face of
uncertainty can cause technological change to occur. But he will face
the same problems in making good decisions as has each Administrator in
the last ten years. The more completely these problems are resolved the
more certain it can be that the changes imposed by an Administrator are
desirable, by whatever rule of desirability.
7.3 Reconmendations
To begin, there are three areas in which improvements are possible
but which have been largely outside the scope of this study. First, the
NTHSA needs to improve the quality of its accident sampling, investiga-
tion, and analysis. These activities are the NTSA's only source of
information on what problems need to be addressed and on what impact its.
standards are having on those problems. Second, the NHTSA needs to
improve the realism of.its performance measures, particularly in crash-.
worthiness areas. The passive restraint standard will be a conceptual
milestone when it takes effect in that it attempts to measure crash-
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worthiness in terms of injury production rather than in terms of vehicle
mechanics; but the present test dummy is far from a realistic measurement
device even for the few injury mechanisms it simulates. Third, the NHTSA.
needs to rationalize its R&D strategy more than it has. Research support
for-ongoing rulemaking cannot be neglected, since the quality of new
standards depends on it. Since the automobile industry has limited
incentives to do exploratory R&D in safety, the NHTSA's involvement in
this type of R&D is critically important to the promotion of innovations
in safety. The NHTSA must somehow do both types of research, and do them
on a budget not adequate for either. But it should avoid allowing R&D
projects to claim to serve both needs, but deliver on neither. The
success of R&D projects can only evaluated, and thus potentially
improved, if their objectives are clear at their start.
Having given these three areas only enough attention to identify
them as problems, it would be inappropriate to offer recommendations on
how they should be improved. The problems in all three areas have been
realized by the NHTSA and others for some time, and progress in each is
being made.
Recommendations will be offered in four other areas:
One
First, the NHTSA should change the entire tone of the regulatory
process by being more explicit about what is really being decided in that
process. The NHTSA is making policy decisions on the desirability of
different combinations of automobile characteristics, just as individual
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car buyers do. The difference is that the NTHSA's are public policy
choices that affect many people and t therefore considers the interests
of persons besides the individual car buyers. The NHTSA for some time
now has not been single-mindedly pursuing only reductions in traffic
injuries and fatalities. It has been deciding how much in terms of cost
and other penalties will be incurred for reductions in traffic risks and
traffic losses. The agency should say so.
This does not imply that the NHTSA can or should tind some explicit
value of human life and make all its decisions on the basis of cost-
benefit analyses. It also does not imply an abandonment of any legis-
lated objectives, The NHTSA has obviously been instructed by Congress to
place more weight on safety characteristics than does the car buyer-car
manufacturer combination. It can still do so while ackowledging that its
policy decisions consider the reasonableness of the apparent balance
between desirable safety impacts and undesirable cost and inconvenience
impacts.
By emphasizing the policy dimensions of the choice between costs and
risk reductions, the NHTSA can counteract the claims of both those who
see ex post cost-benefit analysis as policy-neutral and therefore the
valid decision criterion and those who refuse to admit that cost
increases can legitimately be a reason for not adopting a risk-reducing
improvement. An Administrator would do better to defend his policy
decisions in terms of his legitimate political authority to make them
than in terms of a supposedly objective analysis of costs and benefits in
a common measure or in terms of constraints in the Safety Act which do
not come close to specifying his decision.
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Two
The hITSA should also make clear to its critics, supporters, and the
public that it must make decisions without full information on cost and
safety impacts, and that this will continue to be necessary even with the
improved predictions that may become possible when the NHTSA's new
accident sampling and investigation system is in operation. The NHTSA
and others should recognize that when it takes action under uncertainty
it is doing just that. A .lse sense of confidence in its estimates does
no one good. But the NHTSA should also recognize that it was given its
unrestrictive charter in part to allow it to take action even when it was
not certain of what it wou'd accomplish by doing so. Congress does the
same thing daily. Coping with uncertainty is a policy problem, and
should be treated as such, just as should be decisions on how much cost
will be incurred for risk reductions. However, if the NHTSA is going to
admit that it makes decisions without full information, it must be
prepared to continue to acquire information on the accuracy of past
estimates and to correct decisions that later appear to have been based
on wrong estimates. The fact that decisions will eventually have to made
on the basis of judgment does not mean that informing that judgment with
available facts can be neglected. Also, decisions to withdraw standards
should not depend on conclusive evidence of their ineffectiveness, any-
more than decisions to issue standards should depend on absolute proof of
effectiveness.
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Three
Statistical experimentation with modified automobiles in normal use
is an excellent way to improve predictions of both cost and safety
impacts. It has seen too little use, however. The NHTSA has used field
tests of modified vehicles in a few cases in an attempt to predict safety
impacts, but most of the field tests involved too few vehicles under too
artificial conditions. The field test with 12,000 General Motors cars
with air bags has given the NHTSA the most precise estimate it has ever
had for the safety impact of a modification. But even that field test
has been insufficient to provide an unimpeachable estimate.
It would be possible to experiment with modifications by adopting a
lower threshhold of required certainty when issuing new standards. The
impacts of the new standards could be evaluated in use, a much easier
task than predicting impacts. Decisions to keep or rescind standards
could then be made on better information than are decisions to issue new
standards now. This approach essentially would experiment with the
entire annual production of ten million automobiles. Field tests of this
size are both frightfully expensive and unnecessary for predicting
impacts, however. What is needed is field testing involving much less
than the full annual production but much more that the NHTSA's taxi cab
fleet tests, even much more than the field test of the air bag-equipped
cars now in use. What is needed is tests involving up to hundreds of
thousands of new automobiles. For certain types of changes such fleet
testing would allow a very good estimation of safety impact. It also
will allow better estimation of production costs. The cost of such an
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experiment would be only a few percent of that of experiments involving
the entire annual production.
This approach would work best with changes that could be easily
integrated into the rest of an automobile. This would allow modified
versions of each model to be produced and sold; the unmodified versions
of each model would be an excellent control. The air bag was such an
easily integrated change. Enlargement of direct or indirect field of
view would not be as the entire body of a car might have to be modified.
Changes like these would have to be limited to all cars in at most one or
two model lines. The information that could be gained rom such an
experiment would be more limited but still useful. Periscopes, new
signaling systems, and automatic braking would perhaps be good candi-
dates. Three-beam and polarized headlamps would not be; they could be
evaluated only by converting all automobiles in an isolated population.
Large-scale field testing also can give car users an opportunity to
familiarize themselves with a change they might not accept all at once.
The NHITSA has put modified vehicles into regular use in government fleets
on occasion in order to observe user reactions. One objective of a much
larger demonstration would be to personally acquaint enough of the public
with a change to actually create a widespread acceptance of the change
should the NHTSA later decide to make it universal. For features like
air bags, which operate only in rare accident situations, large-scale
field testing can give statistical information but can give only a few
individuals first-hand experience with the operation of new features.
But for accident avoidance features like periscopes or automatic braking,
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public exposure can be much broadcr for he same number of modified
vehicles.
The strategy of in-use experimentation is similar to that frequently
used by the manufacturers themselves when they introduce a new feature in
limited quantities. The type of information the manufacturers obtain in
this way is not very different from what the NHTSA needs to obtain. The
advantage it can have in reducing the risks of costly larger mistakes can
be appreciated by both the manufacturers and the NHTSA. The NHTSA would
do well to use the strategy, more often. California has served as a
useful field test for new missions control technology because of the
lead it has over the rest of the nation in the stringency of its auto-
mobile emissions standards. Present small cars and cars with diesel
engines provide some information on what the impacts of fuel economy
regulation might be. To date there has been no equivalent in safety
regulation.
Under existing law, t~;ch field tests are possible only at the
expense of the NHTSA's research budget, which at its present level would
be consumed by a single test, or only when the government has a very
strong bargaining position over the manufacturers. The agreement between
former Secretary of Transportation Coleman and several manufacturers for
a passive restraint demonstration involving half a million automobiles
was essentially for a field test of the sort recommended here. The terms
of that agreement would have been expensive for the manufacturers. They
agreed to it only because of Coleman's upper hand; he had made it clear
that only his and later Secretaries' decisions stood between the manufac-
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turers and a passive restraint standard. The manufacturers should have
been eager for the opportunity to put the field test as well in between
them and the standard. The air bag case was special because the NHTSA
already had all the' information it wanted or felt it needed to promulgate
the standard and therefore could present a credible threat. Such situa-
tions will be rare. But once the NHTSA has in place an accident sampling
and analysis system that can evaluate such changes, it should give con-
sideration to attempting more Coleman-like agreements with the manufac-
turers for changes for which they would be appropriate.
Congress, on its part, should give consideration to two possible
ways of giving the NHTSA legal authority to force manufacturers to
cooperate in field tests when it is unable to negotiate voluntary
agreements with them. One way would be to allow the NHTSA to force
manufacturers to make a certain fraction of their production and sales to
special performance specifications. The other way would be to require
manufacturers to offer particular safety features as options. The first
approach is not unlike present regulation of sales-weighted average fuel
economy. Manufacturers might have to subsidize sales of special vehicles
to compensate for higher manufacturing cost, since buyers may not be wil-
ling to pay for the special features. A version of the second approach
was one of the proposed alternatives rejected by former Secretary Coleman
in favor of the voluntary demonstration plan. The special advantage of
the second approach is that it allows car buyers who want to buy the
safety option to do so, something they have not been able to do very
often. Assuming that enough do, there will be enough modified vehicles
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produced and sold to allow field testing. The very special disadvantage
of the second approach is that the government would have to ensure that
the price of an optional safety features that is part of an experiment is
kept low enough to promote sales, perhaps even below marginal or average
cost. The government has never before attempted to control automobile
pricing policy in such detail before. There is the additional problem
that manufacturers and dealers can easily make it impossible for a car
buyer to insist on an option that they prefer ot to sell. Clearly, both
of these possible approaches need considerable refinement and analysis
before a scheme can be developed which ensures that its goals are met in
a relatively undisruptive and equitable fashion.
The NHTSA now has the authority to set different specifications for
different types of automobiles, but only if "appropriate". A review
court would likely find inappropriate a distinction that was made solely
to allow in-use experimentation. In addition, the NHTSA presently cannot
force a manufacturer to produce any type of car; it can only restrict the
production of nonconforming types. A change to allow the NHTSA to write
standards for part of a manufacturer's production would thus be a signi-
ficant departure from past practice, but a useful one.
An alternative would be for Congress to pay the extra costs to the
manufacturers of such large fields tests. Compared to the social cost of
traffic accidents, such an expenditure could easily be as good an
investment as expenditures on energy or health research. Given the
NHTSA's experiences with its substantive and appropriations committees,
it is more likely to get favorable changes made in the Safety Act to
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increase its authority than changes in its budget to greatly increase its
funds for field testing.
Four
The NHTSA should go public in ways it has tried to avoid for the
past several years. For many years now, the NHTSA has not told outsiders
what it was planning or why it has made its decisions the way it has.
Unlike some other regulatory agencies, the NHTSA does not publish support
papers for its decisions. One reason is that while the agency was main-
taining an image of objective and impartial executer of the congressional
will, it could hardly afford to release the incomplete information on
which it was actually making its decisions. And in periods when the
Administrators of the NHTSA were simply not taking new initiatives or
completing old ones because of their own policy choices, it was most
comfortable for them if others could not observe the choices made and the
basis for them. If the NHTSA is going to make political decisions it
must provide to the public the information they need to monitor and
influence those decisions. Review courts are not allow!] to substitute
their own policy judgment for that of an agency; the public, in contrast,
should be able to do so and they must have information on which to base
their positions. Additionally, if the public understands even the
limited reasons for the NHTSA's choices, they can better support those
choices with which they agree. Delegated authority should be exercised,
but those who delegated it should not have to put such blind trust in the
delagatees.
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